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CHERNYSHEV COMMENTS ON U.S. 'ABANDONING' SALT II

LD231528 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1115 GMT 23 Dec 86

["Ideas of Reykjavik and U.S. Actions" program, presented by commentator Andrey Ptashnikov, with TASS military observer Vladimir Chernyshev]

[Excerpts] [Ptashnikov] [passage omitted] There is seemingly no danger in the introduction of only one additional nuclear weapons' carrier in excess of the level stipulated by the SALT II Treaty, if the treaty permits possession of 2,400 carriers, with 1,320 of them allowed to have MIRVed warheads or to carry cruise missiles.

[Chernyshev] Right, strictly speaking this is true. Nothing out of the ordinary happened at first sight -- the United States had 130 heavy bombers fitted with cruise missiles, now they have 131; what is the big deal? This only led to an increase of some fractions of a percent in the potential of the U.S. strategic bomber force, and in terms of strategic nuclear forces as a whole, even less than that. Perhaps that is not perfectly right, but there still is nothing terribly wrong with it. Right, it seems to be true. The addition of one more bomber carrying cruise missiles, to the U.S. nuclear arsenal has not effectively impaired the approximate military balance of the USSR and the United States. But what is involved, however, is not just one aircraft. The point is, the Washington administration is derailing the agreed-upon legal system securing a military parity between the Soviet Union and the United States, and this system has been curbing the strategic arms race over a number of years.

Having trampled upon the SALT II treaty, Washington acted as a violator of the process of cardinally reducing and eliminating nuclear weapons, and did this in the most cynical way. It is destroying the very foundation of that process. The repercussions of the relinquishment of the treaty by the United States are quite far-reaching. First, it means that Washington abandons the principle of equitability and equal security, which was laid in the foundation of the treaty.

[Tashnikov] Vladimir Nikolayevich, what precisely are the objectives pursued by the U.S. Administration in connection with their abandoning the SALT II treaty? How can their moves be assessed in the light of the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting in Reykjavik, and how would they affect the Geneva talks on nuclear and space weapons?

[Chernyshev] The decision to increase its strategic means arsenal and to cross out the SALT II treaty is dictated by nothing else than by Washington's desire to achieve military superiority. The Reagan administration long been undertaking actions obviously violating the treaty. Thus, for instance, in ignoring the special limitations envisaged by the protocol attached to that treaty, the United States has embarked on mass deployment of long-range cruise missiles. Washington also tiptoed around the treaty, having deployed medium-range missiles in Western Europe, missiles which are a direct extension of the U.S. strategic potential. And now Washington has decided to get rid of the treaty altogether, because the latter has become a serious obstacle on the path of fulfilling military programs.

In precisely the same way, plans and interests of the U.S. military and industrial complex come into conflict with another very important treaty -- that on limiting the antimissile defense systems, or the ABM Treaty, as we call it. The United States has conceived the creation of a widescale system of antimissile defense with space-based elements, the system of strike space weapons. That is why the ABM Treaty is, for the U.S. Administration, the next target after the SALT II treaty. The administration has now started shaking this treaty loose as well.

The breach of the SALT II treaty and the attempts to do the same with the ABM Treaty are in all cases of a similar design. Through stepping up their strategic offensive forces they want to create opportunities for dealing a first disarming strike. Through setting up a space shield, they aspire to protect themselves from a retaliatory strike of retribution.

It is also quite revealing that the U.S. Administration has decided to deal a blow on the structure of fundamental accords in the field of limiting strategic armaments precisely at the moment that a prospect for normalizing the international situation finally emerged. The Soviet program for eliminating nuclear weapons by the year 2000 has met with wide understanding and an encouraging response throughout the world. The initiatives put forward on its basis and brought by our country to the meeting in Reykjavik, opened real ways for achieving a nonnuclear world. The premise for a turning point in the entire international situation emerged. The fact that the U.S. Administration chose precisely that moment to torpedo the SALT II treaty cannot be seen as anything else but a major provocation, an attempt to arrest the tendency for relaxing international tensions.

[Ptashnikov] Valdimir Nikolayevich, as is known, the Soviet Government declared that the Soviet Union, for the time being, would refrain from walking out from the accords on SALT I and SALT II. Could the unilateral adherence to these accords affect the security of of our country, and for how long can the Soviet Union restrain itself? Judging from letters, a great number of our listeners are concerned with this issue.

[Chernyshev] Basically, you are right. It is a very serious and a very important question. The Soviet Union naturally had all grounds for relinquishing -- and relinquishing automatically -- the relevant obligations of the treaty and the accord, which are being dismantled by the United States. If one was to be guided by emotions alone, perhaps that would be the right thing to do. The Soviet leadership, however, was proceeding from different considerations when examining the issue, that is, from sensibly made estimates, from the inner logic of our policies. It thoroughly considered the political, military, and -- I would even say -- moral aspects of the situation which is shaping itself. It arrived at the conclusion for the need to make extra efforts in order to protect mankind from the threat of slipping onto the track of strategic chaos. Having declared that the USSR will, for the time being, adhere to the limitations, the Soviet side proceeds from the enormous universal significance of that issue, from the same noble and humane motives that stand behind our program for eliminating all nuclear weapons -- the Soviet 18-month-long moratorium on any nuclear explosions -- behind the large-scale compromise proposals of the Soviet Union in Reykjavik.

The Soviet Union has declared that it will be following very closely the actions of the United States with regard to parity and whether it is affected by excessive loads by the U.S. military programs. All actions undertaken by the USSR, including those which are unilateral, have been thoroughly thought out and weighed, in order not to jeopardize the security of our country. The Soviet leadership has stated firmly that it will not tolerate U.S. military superiority over the Soviet Union. [passage omitted]

PENTAGON SAYS 10 MX MISSILES ON 'COMBAT ALERT'

LD232310 Moscow TASS in English 2140 GMT 23 Dec 86

[Text] Washington December 23 TASS -- Ten latest MX ballistic missiles each tipped with ten nuclear warheads have been deployed and put on combat alert in the area of the U.S. Air Force Base Warren in Wyoming, a spokesman for the Pentagon said.

These ten missiles are the first among the 50 MX missiles to be phased in and appropriations for whose construction and deployment have already been [illegible] by Congress. The administration, according to a report of the White House and Pentagon press office, intends to seek from Congress appropriations for another 50 MX missiles and also for the development and construction of special railway flatcars for them. Simultaneously President Reagan has decided to give a go-ahead to full-scale work to develop a new mobile ballistic missile Midgetman.

Thus after trampling underfoot the SALT-2 treaty, the U.S. Administration is making fresh steps directed at starting a new spiral of the nuclear weapons race. In wresting from Congress ever new billions of dollars to create new types and kinds of nuclear weapons on the "Star Wars" programme the administration is cynically using the "argument" that a buildup of the U.S. nuclear arsenals and developments aimed at spreading the weapons race into outer space "will contribute to progress" at the talks with the Soviet Union on the limitation and reduction of strategic offensive weapons.

NONPROLIFERATION TALKS HELD IN WASHINGTON

LD201120 Moscow TASS in English 1056 GMT 20 Dec 86

[Text] Washington December 20 TASS -- Another round of Soviet-American consultations on matters related to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons was held here.

The Soviet delegation was led by B.A. Semenov, deputy chairman of the U.S.S.R. Committee for Atomic Energy, and the American -- by special envoy Richard Kennedy.

The sides discussed a wide range of issues dealing with the consolidation of the regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, including the tasks of strengthening the treaty of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the system of IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) safeguards and controls over nuclear export.

They also discussed matters related to the establishment of nuclear-free zones in different regions of the world and exchanged views on possible ways for strengthening the regime of safe development of nuclear power.

During the consultations the Soviet side emphasized the need for achieving real progress in the sphere of nuclear disarmament and for a complete termination of nuclear weapons tests as required by the non-proliferation treaty.

It was noted that the absence of such progress and the destruction of agreements on the limitation of strategic offensive arms were fraught with negative consequences for the regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Both sides came out in favor of working jointly with other countries to consolidate the regime of non-proliferation and enhance the efficiency of the treaty, specifically by means of expanding the number of its signatories. They emphasized the need for developing international cooperation in the sphere of peaceful uses of nuclear power.

The sides agreed to continue consultations on matters related to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in the summer of 1987.

'INTERNATIONAL SITUATION -- QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS'

LD200430 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1030 GMT 19 Dec 86

["International Situation -- Questions and Answers" program with political observer Aleksandr Zholkver and commentators Vladimir Fedayev, Igor Charikov, and Vyacheslav Lavrentyev; names of commentators replying to questions supplied when identified]

[Excerpts] [Question] Yuriy Aleksandrovich Abrasakhalov says the following questions interest him. Won't the introduction of the moratorium on testing nuclear weapons in the USSR affect the defense capability of our Armed Forces? The United States has carried out 24 nuclear explosions; France continues testing, and Britain, the Republic of South Africa [RSA], Pakistan, and Israel possess nuclear weapons. And a second question: Would you discuss Soviet-Cuban relations on matters of war peace?

[Answer] Your question is perfectly understandable. Of late, the subject has been worrying very many Soviet people. Indeed, the acts carried out in Reykjavik by our leadership are so constructive and they go so far toward nuclear disarmament that some people are involuntarily asking if we are not weakening ourselves by these initiatives. The chief of staff of the USSR Armed Forces, Marshal Akhromeyev, addressed a press conference and made it understood that, of course, it is not a simple matter. We have, after all, made this decision after serious consideration, but either way our defense might remain sufficiently firm and the views of our military leaders can serve as evidence that we are not in fact disarming ourselves; we are not becoming weaker from the point of view of our defense potential.

[Second commentator] I would like to say that this kind of question is being posed not only by you, but also quite often in the West, including among representatives of the antiwar movement. I was the television moderator of a broadcast consisting of a roundtable conversation with leaders of the antiwar movement in the FRG. It was entitled -- not fortuitously -- From Hasselbach to Reykjavik. Hasselbach is a place in the FRG where a major U.S. military base having cruise missiles is sited. At this roundtable we also talked about the fact that, of course, the Soviet Union cannot extend the moratorium infinitely. Taking care of our security is a matter for constant and attentive examination, both in the CPSU Central Committee and in our military leadership. It would be absolutely wrong to act in the way that certain politicians in the West have been acting. You'll recall, perhaps, that this was discussed during Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's meeting with Norwegian Prime Minister Brundtland. Those in the West have said that after 500 days of a Soviet moratorium, wouldn't it be good if there were another 500 days; wouldn't it be good if the Soviet Union adopted unilateral measures in the field of conventional weapons. But the Western politicians are misapprehending the situation, when the wish is always addressed just to one side.

Imagine for a moment what the outcry in the world would be if the United States had silenced its Nevada test site for 500 days and during this time the Soviet Union had carried out 24 explosions of nuclear weapons at Semipalatinsk. Suffice to imagine this situation, in order to understand just how great is the actual contribution that the Soviet Union has already made to nuclear disarmament. Of course, these acts cannot be limitless. This was also said sufficiently frankly by the Norwegian minister, and it was stressed that in order to move along the path that has already led to Reykjavik and to move along the path to nuclear disarmament, we need the will of both sides. We need actions from both powers, not just from the Soviet Union, but also from the United States.

In this respect, it must be said that the role of the antiwar movement both in our country and abroad is sufficiently great to apply pressure on certain circles in the United States so that they might follow our example.

[Third commentator] On the second question: It must be said that the Cuban leadership fully supports our peaceful foreign policy course. As a matter of fact, Cuba is perhaps one of a few countries that is particularly acutely aware of the military burden. The 90 miles separating the United States from Cuba force Fidel Castro and the other Cuban leaders to pay maximum attention to defense. More than 7 million people took part in some way in the most recent exercises that have just taken place in Cuba, out of about 10 million people now living in Cuba. That means the civilian population, the elderly, and children were included. Well, their role was, so to speak, minimal; they had to go into concealment, but nevertheless you can see what kind of efforts, just how much organizational work had to be done, in order to mobilize 7 out of 10 million people.

It is no exaggeration when I say that there have been 24 attempts on the life of Fidel Castro. This has been the actual case. We are talking about state terrorism -- CIA men have been caught at it 24 times. I'll tell you about one of them, for example. Fidel has contacts with many journalists, including Americans. He was on good terms with one of these journalists, then suddenly a parcel arrives for Fidel from this journalist in the United States. You know, Fidel is a keen underwater hunter, and the parcel contained a diving suit. Well, it turned out that Fidel was busy and this suit lay unused for more than a month, and in that time information came through that the suit had nothing at all to do with this journalist. It was checked through more carefully, and it turned out that it was impregnated with nerve gas which is activated in the water. If he had put it on, he would have dived and never come up.

Cuba is now the face of socialism, and all Latin America is watching it. So why is Reagan actually so aggressive against Cuba? Because any Latin American arriving in Cuba starts to see with open eyes and marvel that it is now possible, for example, to travel around Havana all night perfectly safely. No one will trouble you, and no one will put his hand in your pocket. In Venezuela the contrast is so striking between the poor and rich that the deprived have hatred in their eyes; it jumps out at you. And there they don't steal rings off fingers; they cut the fingers off. They don't say 'Your money or your life' there; straight off they just hit you and then search you. If they find anything, fine, if they don't well... life there's not worth a bean. When a Latin American comes to Cuba, he doesn't even have to be persuaded; everything is clear to him. Quite recently, the United States stopped all contacts with Cuba -- they are not even allowing politicians or journalists to go to that island. All this is being done in order to isolate, and not only to isolate Cuba from the United States, but the United States from Cuba.

[Commentator] The recent measures banned visas to Cuban models who were to display Cuban fashions at one of the exhibition centers of the United Nations. That's the kind of threat hanging over the United States.

[Passage omitted: A senior craftsman asks at what stage of research and development are the nuclear weapons of Israel and the RSA. This was discussed recently at the UN Security Council. One of the written questions asks about the results of Gorbachev's visit to India. The answer gives a description of India's population and economic progress. For more than 30 years the USSR has had stable, mutually beneficial relations with India, cooperating in fields such as power engineering, heavy machine-building, and metallurgy. India is a leader in the Nonaligned Movement. Apart from the Delhi declaration, agreements on various subjects, including economic cooperation, were signed during the visit.]

[Question] Vasiliy Matveyevich Cherkassov, engineer, writes: In the mid-fifties, I was works Komsomol organizer and we met very many young people from abroad. I particularly remember meeting young Chinese people who were friendly and open. If you had told us then that our relationship would have a falling out, we would not, of course, have believed you; neither we nor they.

[Answer] I would like to mention two main events in the history of development of our relations with the PRC which we have witnessed literally in the past few days. First, after a break of many years we have once again opened up a PRC General Consulate in Leningrad and a Soviet General Consulate in Shanghai. This is, as you will understand, a big step and upturn in our relations onto a qualitatively new stage of expansion. The second thing I am thinking of is the large, really a major, Soviet trade and industrial exhibition that is under way in Beijing now. You have probably seen our reports from the Chinese exhibition that was held not that long ago in Moscow, and now we have an exhibition in return. Taking part in it are a large number of our foreign trade associations, with more than 500 exhibits.

Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov, the chairman of the Council of Ministers, sent a message of greeting to the participants in the exhibition, and this message stressed that in recent years there has been a considerable improvement in relations between the Soviet Union and the PRC. Various ties are expanding; trade is increasing, and economic, scientific-technological, and cultural cooperation is developing. It also recalled that the 27th CPSU Congress noted that there is immense potential for our cooperation and that the Soviet people welcome with respect the aim set by the Communist Party of China of modernizing the country and building a socialist society in peaceful conditions.

The exhibition has been visited by a whole series of important Chinese leaders, including Zhao Ziyang, premier of the State Council. A delegation from our Soviet Government is there, and after visiting the exhibition, Zhao Ziyang said that this exhibition is creating a propitious opportunity for the Chinese people to become acquainted with the achievements of the Soviet people. He also expressed confidence that the exhibition will make a contribution to the cause of strengthening friendship between the peoples of the two countries and the development of economic and commercial ties between the USSR and the PRC. Naturally, we have similar attitudes to a considerable extent on a whole range of major international problems.

Take, for example, the speech by the representative of the PRC in the Special Political Committee of the UN General Assembly: He said that China opposes all forms of the arms race in space and the militarization of space. But nevertheless, comrades, we cannot pass over what I would call certain attempts at putting the policies of the two powers, the Soviet Union and PRC, on the same plane. This was reflected in Beijing's attitude to the problems of Reykjavik. There was a statement from Beijing that China expected nothing good from Reykjavik, because over there they believed that in any event only two -- as they put -- superpowers are pushing ahead the arms race. True, they immediately added that in any event Beijing does believe that dialogue is better than military confrontation, and that they advocate the continuation of the Soviet-U.S. talks on disarmament.

As for policy, a reform of the political structure, as Deng Xiaoping puts it, is now under way. Much is now under study and review, and this is directly connected, as he himself stresses, with the need to overcome bureaucracy and to mobilize the grass-roots organizations, including those in the party, and the mass of the people. In an interview with Hu Yaobang, the general secretary of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, given to the West German newspaper DIE WELT, this is literally what was said: Our planned reform of political structures is self-improvement of a socialist system and not an attempt at eliminating it.

[Question] Yakov Izmaylovich Vasilyev, an engraver, writes: Comrade Fadeyev, why did Babrak Karmal request his release from his state and party posts?

[Fadayev] Following his speech at the 16th Plenum of the PDPA Central Committee, where, if you follow events in Afghanistan, he came out with a very interesting program for the expansion of the social base of people's power, Comrade Karmal put before the leadership of the Central Committee and the Politburo the question of relieving him of part of his workload, of at least one of his posts. He held two very important posts -- first, general secretary of the PDPA Central Committee and second, chairman of the DRA Revolutionary Council Presidium, that is, the supreme organ of power in the DRA. He wanted to be released due to the state of his health. This request was examined later and granted. You know that at the 18th Plenum of the PDPA Central Committee, Comrade Najib was elected general secretary. Babrak Karmal retained the post of chairman of the DRA Revolutionary Council Presidium. The 20th Plenum of the PDPA Central Committee held on 22 January considered it possible to satisfy Comrade Babrak Karmal's second request and released him from the post that remained, the post of chairman of the DRA Revolutionary Council Presidium. Comrade Babrak Karmal offered one reason -- his poor state of health.

Now what can I add personally as one who has lived for several years in Afghanistan? I would like to express a view of the style and methods that today are characteristic of the party Central Committee and Politburo that are new and have appeared following the 18th Plenum of the PDPA Central Committee. It is no accident that the party members themselves call it the plenum of restructuring, the plenum of renewal. This really is so. I think that the demands made on the party leadership, including the leader himself, by today's revolutionary situation in the country -- and it must be said that it is not a simple one at all -- were, in my view, given his state of health, probably beyond his ability to undertake normally. Of course, Karmal's age was such that, I think, it was difficult for him to cope with the demands and circumstances that emerged in life. Incidentally, the changes that have taken place under the new leader are noticeable today. There is more material in the papers now on what the PDPA Central Committee and its Politburo are doing; there is more openness. Party functionaries -- and I use this word in a good, positive sense here -- have started traveling more to the provinces and meeting the people.

For several years I drove past Delkosha Palace, Babrak Karmal's residence, every day. As it happens, particularly in such countries, there is a custom of receiving petitioners. You may remember we also had petitioners from the villages being received by Lenin in the first years after the revolution. I could not cite a single example to illustrate vividly, say, how crowds of petitioners came to see Babrak Karmal, how he received them, patiently listening to their requests and carefully looking into their problems. This simply was not the way things were done. These days, every Thursday -- this is the eve of the day of rest in the Muslim calendar -- at Delkosha Palace, Comrade Najib, the new party leader, holds extensive meetings with people at which a frank, democratic, and sometimes impartial [nelitsepriyatnyy] [as heard] discussion is held with these petitioners. This has become the general rule and normal procedure.

[Question] Pavel Vasilyevich, who works in the dispatch offices, writes: With what forces inside Iran did the present U.S. Administration attempt to establish contact through the mission of McFarlane, and what was Khomeyni's reaction to this?

[Answer] The Americans sought moderate forces in Iran with whom they would like to establish contact, so as to influence the situation in Iran through them.

But as is already clear from the hearings taking place on this affair in the U.S. Congress, they failed to find such forces. As far as Khomeyni is concerned, he stated quite categorically at the very beginning that he had no contacts with the Americans.

[Second commentator answers] As far as the final part of the reply to the question is concerned, I would just like to cite a few remarks by Khomeyni himself on this. Here is the report as transmitted by a UPI correspondent from Iran. Khomeyni stated the following when the whole Irangate business began to flare up: I must congratulate everyone on the powerful explosion that has taken place in Washington over the recent approach to Tehran. The U.S. President -- these are Khomeyni's exact words -- should go into mourning over this shameful episode, and the White House should be called the Black House it has always been.

It must be said that there has also been speculation about Hashemi-Rafsanjani. He is the speaker of the Majlis, the Iranian parliament, and speculation was that he conducted talks with at least the first large group. You will no doubt know, comrades, that the first group comprised McFarlane, the former U.S. presidential national security adviser; and was accompanied by the present-day U.S. James Bond, Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North, an official of the National Security Council. They traveled under false Norwegian passports, posing as crew-members on an aircraft that landed there, bringing several metric tons of military cargo.

They delivered mainly spare parts for the Iranian Air Force. According to Pentagon valuations they were worth $12 million. According to the most modest estimates, they received $30 million for the parts, and according to some estimates, $32 million. So that was a profit level of over 200 percent. A lucrative deal! What happened to the additional $18-20 million? The money disappeared on the way. You will know that a false account was opened in a Swiss bank under Lt Col North's name. If people can make a bit on the side and transfer cash even from a CIA account to their personal account, they do so. This is what happened in this instance. But the money didn't just go to North's personal account and the accounts of certain other present and former CIA officials. Fairly important U.S. politicians also clearly received a large cut.

[Question] I am Yuriy Aleksandrovich Abasakhalov, an engineer-designer. I have a question to ask. At the beginning of the sixties, there arose such a situation around Cuba, when the U.S. troops could have invaded the country. Our government at that time was taking very energetic diplomatic and other measures, and one felt that Cuba could not be invaded. In my view, the same situation has arisen today with regard to Nicaragua. But one does not somehow feel the same active approach, if one judges by the press, that is.

[Answer] Well, you know, I simply categorically disagree with you, because one of the directions into which the efforts of our government and of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev are now channelled is to untie the knots of these regional conflicts. These conflicts have occurred in the Near East, Central America, around Nicaragua, and in Southeast Asia. Many effrorts are being made here.

Moreover, precisely the forces getting involved in solving these problems are those which were generally in a slumber before and failed to take part. Take the Central American crisis, for example. Almost all Latin American countries are now trying to solve or contribute to solving it. You know about the Contadora group, about the support group? If we list them -- Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay -- you will see that these are the major Latin American countries. Practically the entire continent is joining in finding a solution to this problem. They are taking a stance, moreover, which is wholly shared by the Soviet Union.

This implies above all a peaceful solution of this problem, and, of course, the United States and Reagan will have to think hard before they decide to unleash an armed conflict against Nicaragua. These countries are taking an uncompromising stance. Mexican President Miguel de la Madrid is not embarrassed about expressing his completely contrary views on Central American problems in his conversations with Reagan. These things never happened before. Latin America was always considered to be the backyard of the United States. The U.S. is, indeed, enjoying colossal influence there, especially economic influence, considering the enormous debts that have accumulated. Can you imagine, Brazil has a debt of over $100 billion; Argentina has a $45 billion debt. These are the levers the United States would like to use to direct the foreign policy of these countries, but the levers are not working now.

[Question] My name is Trofim Borisovich Kovezhnikov. I work in a personnel department. My question is: How is the situation around Syria currently developing, and what will the USSR's position be if Syria is attacked?

[Answer] You have asked a question about one of the regions we count among the world's trouble spots. It is a trouble spot for a whole set of reasons. Above all, it is a region where we see the U.S. policy of neoglobalism applies, a policy manifested in a whole set of regions and here of a particularly pronounced, strong-arm character, so to speak. The point is that the Mediterranean, which is thousands of miles away from the United States, is the area where the U.S. 6th Fleet is concentrated. It is the site of the deployment of a whole string of large U.S. military bases. It is the location of a whole set of recent aggressive military actions undertaken by the United States.

Suffice to recall just the U.S. air raids on Libya. Incidentally, you will probably have noted that over the last few days, what we call Irangate -- the scandal involving U.S. arms supplies to Iran -- has been mounting. The influence of the U.S. special services and the Pentagon in other regions has also been emerging. Among other things, it is emerging, for instance, that Britain was doubly involved in the U.S. air raid in Libya. Not only did the American F-111 bombers which carried out the bombings take off from U.S. bases in Britain with the blessing of British military circles, but, as is now emerging, it was carried out with the direct involvement of British military circles in the selection of targets.

I'm straying from your immediate question about Syria with good reason. This is because the mechanics of this policy of neo-globalism are very important to provide an understanding of what could also happen with Syria. Syria is also being accused of involvement in terrorism, just as Libya was. U.S. armed forces are being concentrated both on the ships of the 6th Fleet and on the U.S. bases in the region. Let me add this: We were talking about how far this region is from the United States. But on the other hand, it is in the immediate vicinity of our southern borders.

You will know that we are linked with Syria by a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. Naturally, the situation cannot fail to cause concern in our country. This is all the more so because, as you will know, our squadron is also in the Mediterranean, along with the U.S. 6th Fleet. What are our proposals? Above all -- and this has been stated in Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's speeches -- the question of military detente in the Mediterranean area is posed. Above all, the issue of the withdrawal from the region of ships carrying nuclear weapons is posed. The question of reducing the strengths of the naval forces of both sides in this region is posed. Above all, of course, the question of a political settlement of the Near East conflict is posed, and first and foremost through the convocation of an international conference on the Near East.

The point is that the Palestinians are deprived of a state of their own because the resolution of the United Nations passed back in 1947 on the creation of two states in this region, an Arab Palestinian state and the Jewish State of Israel, has not been fulfilled. Only half of this resolution was fulfilled. The State of Israel was established. The Palestinian Arabs were deprived of a state of their own. They have settled in different parts of this region. They are in Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan. Both the UN resolutions and documents of the Soviet Government defend the sole, just viewpoint that the Palestinians have the same right to the creation of their own state as the State of Israel. This is, of course, linked to the important role played by Syria in the region. Syrian military contingents are part of the inter-Arab forces on Lebanese territory. Syria pursues a consistently anti-imperialist policy, and that is why all sorts of threats and pressure are directed toward it.

Put briefly, the point is that a political solution to this issue of the Near East conflict is needed, with the involvement of all the Arab states concerned, including Syria of course, and with the participation of the five permanent members of the Security Council, which includes the Soviet Union. [Passage omitted: An employee in a personnel office asks about the U.S. state system of misinformation. (?Lavrentyev) explains that the only state-controlled part of the mass media is the Voice of America radio station and that the remainder is in private hands, and goes on to say that while the journalists are professionals, they are prepared to present material favorable to the Soviet Union so rarely you can count them on your fingers. He personally saw one positive film during his 4 years in the United States. A quality control supervisor asks for details of what was behind the death of Samantha Smith and her father.]

KASHLEV HOLDS NEWS CONFERENCE ON CSCE ISSUES

Cites U.S. 'Duplicity'

LD231723 Moscow TASS in English 1653 GMT 23 Dec 86

[Text] Moscow December 23 TASS -- The exchange of views held at the all-European meeting in Vienna has demonstrated opposite approaches to the discussion of the course of implementation of the provisions of the Helsinki and Madrid accords, a press conference held here today was told by Yuriy Kashlev, head of the USSR Foreign Ministry's Administration for Humanitarian and Cultural Relations, who heads the Soviet delegation.

Some delegates, he said, were sincerely trying to hold discussions on an equal footing and briefed the others on what is being done in their countries to implement the Helsinki and Madrid accords, expressed constructive proposals and made critical remarks when necessary. The others struck the posture of prosecutors and were speaking only about the affairs of other peoples, passing over in silence their own affairs, were trying to warp the whole process of the Conference on European Security and Cooperation.

Some delegations concentrated on malicious attacks against other countries, trying in every way possible to slander their policy and practices.

As the discussion of the military-political issues has shown, the dividing line in the approaches of the participating countries to the problems of security in Europe and realization of their commitments under the Final Act runs between those, who, acting in the spirit of new thinking, wish for settling international problems and strengthening universal security and those, who acting from force of inertia, are clinging tenaciously to confrontation, trying to frustrate the positive changes in the world. Figuratively speaking, this dividing line runs not between political blocs, but between political thinking.

One of these tendencies was personified by the Soviet Union and the socialist countries. Among its milestones were: the programme for the elimination until [as received] the end of this century of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, which was advanced by Mikhail Gorbachev in his statement of January 15 this year; the USSR's bold and cardinal proposals at Reykjavik; the unilateral termination of nuclear tests by the Soviet Union, and others.

Another approach found its expression in the adoption by the USA of the "Star Wars" programme and the drawing of other countries into it, in the frustration of the agreements, which began to take shape at Reykjavik, and the course for the total scrapping of its outcome, in the continuing nuclear weapons tests, in the abandonment of the SALT-2 Treaty containing the weapons race, in the attempt to torpedo the fundamentals of the ABM Treaty, i.e. in undermining practically all the key instruments of maintaining strategic stability in the world.

On issues related to trade-economic and scientific-technical ties, to enviromental protection, discussions were more or less businesslike, and interest in those issues was displayed by most of the delegations.

Questions pertaining to human rights and cooperation in the humanitarian field occupied a great and important place in the discussions on the implementation of the Helsinki and Madrid accords. Deplorably, the discussion of those issues was in a larger measure in the character of confrontation than on any other acute problems. The lead in that policy of confrontation was taken by the delegations of the USA, Canada and Britain.

Representatives of the USA, the country which perpetrated over the period between Madrid and Vienna crying acts of direct aggression against Libya, Grenada and Nicaragua, which trampled underfoot the Helsinki Declaration, the country disregarding the decisions of the international court, systematically perpetrating crude and massive violations of human rights and basic freedoms on its own territory, were not ashamed to pose for prosecuting attorneys. The destructive policy of the U.S. delegation and those who aligned with it was characterized by duplicity, double standards, the spokesman for the USSR Foreign Ministry said.

It is necessary to look thoroughly, in a businesslike manner into the whole complex of humanitarian issues in order to speed up progress in that field, he said. That is precisely why the Soviet delegation tabled a proposal that a conference be held in Moscow of the countries -- participants in the Conference on European Security and Cooperation on problems of humanitarian cooperation. A comprehensive examination of humanitarian issues directed at achieving practical results, and their discussion in the context of human rights would undoubtedly contribute to the attainmente of the common goal. We hope that this proposal will be a subject of an objective examination at the Vienna meeting.

Comments on Sakharov

LD232300 Moscow in English to Great Britain and Ireland 2000 GMT 23 Dec 86

[Excerpts] The Soviet delegation to the Helsinki follow-up conference in Vienna has just returned to Moscow for the end of the year recess. Upon its arrival, the delegation held a press conference to sum up the results of the first stage of the Vienna meeting of the 35 countries engaged in the Helsinki process of cooperation and security in Europe. Nikolay Gorshkov was at the Soviet Foreign Ministry press center and here's his report:

[Gorshkov] Moscow's international press corps was addressed by the head of the Soviet delegation, Ambassador Yuriy Kashlev. [passage omitted] Yuriy Kashlev then answered some of the media questions.

[Begin recording] [(Inns)] (Carol Inns) of ASSOCIATED PRESS. Can you tell us, does the Soviet Government consider that the people have the right to dissent from the views and policies of the Communist Party and to speak out about those differences, and if so does the government consider that a mistake was made when Andrey Sakharov was sent into exile 7 years ago? [end recording]

If you take the Soviet press, Yuriy Kashlev said, even in the Communist Party newspaper PRAVDA, not to mention such periodicals as the LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, you'll find plenty of opinions different from official ones. Anything is subject to criticism in the Soviet Union these days, and it is difficult to sort out which opinions differ from official ones and which do not. What matters is that different opinions help to arrive at optimal solutions. As far as Andrey Sakharov is concerned, said Ambassador Kashlev, his dissent went beyond voicing his opinions. He committed certain actions qualified as slander against this state and was prosecuted according to the law of the land. Recently he was pardoned on humanitarian grounds and now has every opportunity to continue his scientific work in Moscow.

Another question on the same topic followed.

[Begin recording] [(Emmett)] (Peter Emmett) CNN, a question for Ambassador Kashlev. This morning Dr Sakharov returned to Moscow and he answered many of our questions -- one about Afghanistan. In response to that question he said, I consider this is the most painful part of our foreign policy, and I hope there will be more decisive measures taken in that sphere than are being taken at present. Wasn't this the kind of comment that persuaded your government to send Dr Sakharov into exile originally, and if he continues to make such comments is it possible that he will be returned to internal exile? [end recording]

I personally do not see anything wrong in Dr Sakharov's statement, Ambassador Kashlev replied. The Soviet leadership has more than once said that it is for a speedy solution to the Afghan problem and would like to return all the Soviet troops temporarily stationed there. And the people who said such things about Afghanistan are not necessarily sent to the city of Gorkiy. And if Dr Sakharov is sincere and objective in his opinions, I don't think he'll even be prosecuted.

Another question followed.

[Begin recording] [(Barber)] (Tony Barber) of REUTERS. Can one of the panel confirm that the Soviet Union follow [as heard] the examples of Hungary and Poland and allow more than one candidate to stand in elections to local government organs and so on, thus giving people a bit more choice in elections? [end recording]

You know, said the Soviet chief delegate, electoral practices differ in different countries. Before one candidate emerges in the Soviet constituency, he competes with many others in his work place or residential district for nomination. In fact, many candidates are being proposed, discussed, rejected or upheld during the pre-election nomination procedures. So this is purely a question of different practices under different electoral systems, the chief Soviet delegate to the Helsinki follow-up conference in Vienna, Yuriy Kashlev, said in conclusion of his press conference held in Moscow on the results of the first stage of the Vienna conference.

Views Jewish Emigration

LD232323 Moscow World Service in English 2110 GMT 23 Dec 86

[Excerpts] There has been a news conference in Moscow to discuss the results of the (?first stage) of the Vienna meeting of the participants in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: 33 European countries, the United States and Canada. How can the work done there be summed up? Has the meeting been advancing the cause of security and cooperation? [passage omitted]

Asked about the Soviet Union's stand on the problem of emigration of Soviet citizens, Jews included, Yuriy Kashlev answered this:

[Begin Kashlev recording in Russian with superimposed English translation] You know in (?their) time, a bit less than 300,000 and to be more precise, 270,000 Jews left the USSR. Many Germans have moved out too. In recent times a lot has been done to bring travel regulations strictly in conformity with the international commitments of the USSR and other countries. Over 11 months of this year, some 150,000 Soviet citizens have travelled to other countries to visit their relatives. Four and a half thousand Soviet citizens have left to reunite with their families and have taken permanent residence abroad. [end recording]

A question was asked about the reasons for the protracted stay of Academician Andrey Sakharov in Gorkiy and about his return to Moscow.

[Begin Kashlev recording in Russian with superimposed English translation] As far as Andrey Sakharov is concerned, [word indistinct] some activity he carried out went beyond simple disagreement. When the decision for Sakharov's residence in Gorkiy was made his breaches of the law were spoken of. There were publications which by Soviet legislation are regarded as actions against the state. There also were other unlawful actions, and then it was deemed necessary to adopt appropriate measures. Now a humane step has been taken; Andrey Sakharov has returned to Moscow, and he has got every opportunity to continue his work at the Academy of Science. [end recording]

U.S ARMS FOR IRAN DIVERTED TO AFGHAN REBELS

PM231623 Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian 24 Dec 86 p 2

["Own Information" report under the rubric "Background to Events": "'Irangate': The Afghan Trail"]

[Text] Much is being said and written in the United States about U.S. arms supplies to Iran, but far less about the destination of some of these arms -- to aid the Afghan dushmans. Why? Primarily because it is a far-reaching U.S. act of subversion, not only against Afghanistan, but against the Soviet Union as well.

Afghan-Pakistani talks are continuing. A positive trend has emerged in them. And that is what is causing apprehension in Washington, particularly now that the domestic political situation has deteriorated in Pakistan. Washington does not rule out the possibility of the signing of an Afghan-Pakistani agreement. In that case Pakistan's border with Afghanistan would be closed, well and truly closed! The dushmans would be deprived of bases and aid. Reagan and his administration would like the subversive activity against Afghanistan, and against the Soviet Union for that matter, to continue, and the Soviet military contingent to be detained there, at any cost, even at the cost of continuing U.S. arms supplies to Iran, despite the scandal in Washington. Of course, this is on condition that a considerable proportion of the arms are transferred to Afghanistan.

Washington and those who are helping it in this enterprise are lavishing money on supplies. According to the U.S. press, there are $500 million in secret CIA accounts in Swiss banks, intended not only for the "contras" in Nicaragua, but also for Afghan counterrevolutionaries.

Reagan believes that the "Afghan trump card" will help him to put a lid on the "Irangate" scandal. After all, ultimately the entire procedure involving U.S. arms supplies appears to him to be a legitimate measure against the "Soviet threat." Who would risk calling it into question! The United States wants to go back to Iran and establish a foothold there. Only then would Washington want to halt or ease up in its anti-Afghan intrigues.

In November S. Hunter, deputy director of the Near East project at the Georgetown University (Washington) Center for Strategic and International Studies, wrote in the U.S. paper THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR: "Recent contacts (with Iran) suggest that the Americans and Iranians have broken the psychological barrier which was preventing them from dealing with one another... If Iran turned to the Soviet Union it would be a major strategic loss for the United States. The Russians, once they have acquired considerable influence in Iran, would have a much better chance to consolidate their position in Afghanistan..."

BOVIN VIEWS IMPLICATIONS OF IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR

PM231209 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 Dec 86 Morning Edition p 5

[Article by IZVESTIYA political observer A. Bovin: "Commotion in Washington"]

[Text] What is happening in official Washington can be described in various ways -- crisis, scandal, confusion. I have chosen commotion. Dal's dictionary defines the word as follows: "Fuss, chaos, trouble, turmoil, disorder, shouting, abuse, spat." They all fit.

The secret sale of weapons to Iran and the secret transfer of the money from these weapons to the Somocistas have caused a storm. The President, who, according to Senator Barry Goldwater, who thinks along almost the same lines, has "come a cropper," is defending himself, albeit in unusually limp fashion. Congress has embarked on a veritable "orgy of inquiry." Everyone suspects everyone else. Everyone is unhappy with everyone else. And every day fuel is added to the fire in which U.S. prestige is burning.

The facts of the matter are not absolutely clear as yet. But judging by what the omniscient U.S. journalists are writing, the picture is as follows.

Contacts between Washington and Tehran go back to mid-1985. According to certain data, the initiative came from pro-Western senior officers in the Iranian Army. According to other data, it was the U.S. President who gave the word by sending a letter to Majlis Speaker 'Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani in June 1985.

In all the versions of the development of events one observes the big part played by Israel, which persistently advised R. Reagan to start "playing games" with Tehran.

Israel has its own interests. Back in the early fifties, surrounded by hostile Arabs, the then premier, David Ben-Gurion, started to cultivate relations with key non-Arab states on the perimeter of the region -- Ethiopia, Turkey, and Iran. Tel Aviv met with complete sympathy in the shah's Iran.

After the shah the situation changed dramatically. The new authorities adopted a clear-cut anti-Israeli stance. But Tel Aviv would not give up hope of a return to better times. When the Iran-Iraq war broke out, Israel, regarding Iraq as a moe dangerous enemy than Iran, started sending secret military supplies to Iran. Analysts in Tel Aviv figured that there was a sufficiently strong "moderate" faction in the Iranian leadership which would come to power sooner or later. In helping Iran, Israel was notching up points for the "post-Khomeini" period.

The actual organization of U.S.-Iranian contacts was carried out by David Kimche, then director general of the Israeli Foreign Ministry and former deputy chief of the "Mosad" intelligence service.

Kimche's first meeting with the U.S. President's national security adviser Robert McFarlane was, according to what is being written in Washington, in late July 1985. Kimche actually gave the Americans an Israeli intelligence agent for the purpose of ongoing contacts with Tehran. On 22 November THE NEW YORK TIMES cited the words of an unnamed senior Israeli official who described the agent as follows: "We are talking about a person who is one of the most senior ayatollahs. From our point of view, it would be criminal not to use him... We have been obtaining stupendous intelligence through this channel... We have gotten to the heart of the government. No Western government has gained access to the information we possess. Through these people we have learned a great deal about what is taking place among the ruling circles. It is clear to us that there are different groupings in that country and some are less zealous than others." It is hard to say where the facts end and the hype begins in this description. But the Americans were very keen to find people with "less zeal" and they swallowed the bait.

Together with the overall strategic idea (contacts with "moderates" in Tehran), there was discussion of the fate of hostages who had been captured in Lebanon by the pro-Iranian "Islamic Jihad" group. At first Washington tried to act through Syria, then through the Turks and Algerians. It did not work. So they decided to go direct -- to Tehran.

On 3 September 1985 Kimche reported to McFarlane that Iranian Prime Minister Mir Hoseyn Musavi had agreed to release one hostage in exchange for an aircraftload of military equipment. McFarlane had no objection. The aircraft was dispatched, but it is reported that the load was intercepted by Iranian "radicals" at the airfield in Tehran. The hostage was not released. Only after a second aircraft was sent -- 14 September -- was the priest Benjamin Weir released.

After the third aircraft the plan again misfired, so the Americans canceled further flights. There was a lull. On 4 December 1985 R. McFarlane resigned. The Israel intermediaries also changed. The team was now headed by Amiram Nir, adviser to the Israeli prime minister on matters of terrorism.

The new year brought a revival of U.S.-Iranian contacts. On 17 January 1986 R. Reagan signed a secret document which is regarded as having effectively legitimized arms sales to Iran. Now deliveries were sent by sea: from the Italian port of Talamone, to which it was convenient to ship equipment from U.S. military bases in Italy, to the Israeli port of Eilat, and from there to the Iranian port of Bandar-e 'Abbas.

A total of around 250 metric tons of freight worth 50-60 million dollars were dispatched in 1986. Catholic missionary Lawrence Jenko was released in July and California hospital administrator David Jacobsen in November.

R. McFarlane's unsuccessful trip to Tehran was perhaps the culmination of this 18-month story. A Bible signed by the President and sent to Ayatollah Khomeyni did not help. Ayatollah Reagan [as published] did not receive a copy of the Koran in return. The secret struggle in Tehran ended in defeat for the "moderates," the very people the White House was dealing with. And the secret was out. The Beirut magazine AL-SHIRA' was the first to publish information on the Americans' visit to Tehran -- it was prompted by the Iranians, of course. Evidently to protect himself, one of the "moderates," Hashemi-Rafsanjani, told the public the story of the visit. "We told them," the Majlis speaker said, "that we would not accept their gifts and we had nothing to discuss."

Then the scandal broke. Scandal number one. Scandal number two followed a little later.

It turned out that the military equipment had been sold to Iran for considerably more than its face value. Part of the difference apparently ended up in the hands of various private middlemen, but most of it went to Swiss bank accounts and from there to the Nicaraguan "contras."

U.S. Attorney General E. Meese described a typical deal -- the sale of 500 antitank missiles in August. The army transferred the weapons to the CIA, who promised to pay between $3 and 4 million (approximately $2 million less than the replacement cost). The CIA transferred the weapons to the Israeli middleman who deposited the money for the purchase and additional expenses in a Swiss bank account opened by the CIA. The CIA then paid the money to the Pentagon. Meanwhile, the middlemen sold the missiles to Iran for $19 million, which was placed in a second bank account controlled by the "contras."

As you can see, simple but tasteful...

So why the scandal, why the scandals? Surely, Americans have seen it all! Nothing would surprise them, nothing would disturb their equilibrium, you might think. But even U.S. citizens who have seen it all, congressmen and the political elite above all, do not like it when the chief executive breaks laws.

R. Reagan had no right to sanction sales of military equipment to Iran, because the law prohibits the sale of weapons to states supporting terrorism.

R. Reagan had no right to sanction the transfer of funds to the "contras," because at the time this occurred the congressional ban on such actions was still in force.

But the question remains. Reagan is a very popular president. And, everything being equal, it would have been logical to expect legislators, and many journalists, to turn a blind eye to juridical errors, particularly as rumors have been going around Congress for a long time about intrigues with Tehran and about aid to the "contras." But they were tolerated. There was silence. What made the cup overflow?

I think the President overestimated his invulnerability and went too far. He had been excused on many occasions over a long period. The deaths of the Marines in Beirut. The secret mining of ports in Nicaragua. The visit to the Bitburg cemetary in the FRG. the disinformation campaign to undermine the Libyan regime. The "forgetfulness" after Reykjavik. The endless mistakes, the inability to grasp the crux of the matter, the hypocrisy.

The President was a master at "getting out of a spin." Not for nothing was he nicknamed the "Teflon President." Just as eggs do not stick to a Teflon-coated frying pan, accusations and suspicions have not stuck to the President. But now the Teflon appears to have worn away...

At the November press conferences R. Reagan did not have his usual charm and unshakeable confidence that he was right. In connection with the transfer of funds to the "contras," he always said that he knew nothing. It was all organized by Poindexter and North, while he, the President, was not au courant... To which Senator John Glenn replied: In any event, "this is a sad comment on the President of the United States: If he was informed of the operation, he was deliberately breaking the law. And if the President did not know about it, he was not doing his duty."

Concerning the deals with Iran, the President was more candid. He did not deny that he was "au courant." But he was not exchanging weapons for hostages; he was engaged in grand strategy. Both politically and economically; Iran is important to the United States, so it was necessary to try to arrange contacts, to "start a dialogue."

On this point the President's position did not encounter any objections. Any Washington administration would appreciate the geopolitical significance of Iran and would endeavor to "retrieve" it. The charges against Reagan are not about the tasks themselves, but about the methods used to tackle them. Someone called the problem of competence Reagan's Achilles' heel. Quite so. The President and his people made a gross error in their assessment of the situation in Tehran.

If the strategic theme was the defense's main theme, the prosecution was stressing the moral aspects. What the President was doing was the ultimate in hypocrisy. After all, he had repeatedly urged everyone to observe the embargo on arms supplies to Iran. In July 1985, addressing the American association of lawyers, R. Reagan called the Khomeyni regime an "international corporation of murderers." And he was conducting negotiations with that corporation.

The President swore that he would never talk with terrorists about ransoms for hostages. But he talked. And he did a swap. An aircraft, as we have seen, for a hostage. It is easy to see that the ransoming of one hostage is an invitation to take others. And that is what happened. Three were released and three were taken.

The White House's Iranian adventure is like a magnifying glass, having made the fundamental flaws in Reagan's foreign policy clearer and more obvious. It has made intolerable things which people had grown accustomed to tolerating. "A fatal combination of ignorance and arrogance," David Broder wrote in THE WASHINGTON POST. Larry Martz in NEWSWEEK defined the situation as "the most serious crisis in Reagan's entire Presidency."

The President is trying to focus attention on the scapegoats, but in this case it is not working. Too many people have been offended and insulted by the President's actions. These actions have offended Congress, which has been the victim of deception, intrigues, and abuses of power. They have insulted their allies, who are worried and angry about the policy of "double standards" and are beginning to identify with trepidation signs of the collapse and disintegration of the present administration. They have frightened many Arab leaders who interpreted the sale of military equipment to Iran as a willingness to agree to an Iranian victory.

Occasionally one hears the following argument: The U.S. President went too far in the Soviet Union's direction at Reykjavik. So the military-industrial complex and the U.S. "ultras" have decided to teach their stooge a lesson, give him a fright. Hence the scale of the present wave of criticism.

This train of thought does not convince me. You are hardly likely to find any serious person in the United States who would seriously believe that Reagan has "pro-Soviet" sentiments. Serious people can see where the politics ends and the politicking begins, and they do not confuse the two. It is not that Reagan has stopped being Reagan. I believe that Reagan has become too much even for the United States. While calling for a restriction on the functions of the state, he has extended his own functions to an excessive degree. It is no accident that the National Security Council, which is not accountable to Congress, has become, as many people in Washington believe, the President's "kitchen cabinet." And it is no accident that the incompetence of this "cabinet," rent by contradictions and discord, has jeopardized the effectiveness of Reagan's leadership.

The results of the November elections show that the offensive against Reagan is not from the right and that the pressure on him is by no means being exerted by the military-industrial complex. The electorate's mood has clearly shifted toward the center. Here are a few comments from U.S. papers and magazines: "Reagan's Presidency has 'gone into decline'." The President has "lost the aura of invincibility." Reagan has "made a serious blunder." Reagan's "almost mystical" control over the electorate has "evaporated."

Perhaps these judgments are an example of wishful thinking overtaking the facts. But the facts themselves have a great deal to say. And the current commotion in Washington and criticism of particular foreign policy positions and actions by the President should be viewed primarily against the background of the changes taking place in public opinion in the country.

U.S. NAVY TO ADD 2 NUCLEAR-POWERED CARRIERS

LD240901 Moscow TASS in English 0741 GMT 24 Dec 86

[Text] Tokyo December 24 TASS -- In the Pentagon, it has been decided to build two new nuclear-powered aircraft carriers for the U.S. Navy, a correspondent of the KYODO Tsushin News Agency reports from Washington. It is planned that one of the carriers will be made part of the U.S. fleet in the Pacific Ocean and will take the place of attack aircraft carrier Midway based at the Japanese port of Yokosuka in the second half of the 1990's.

IZVESTIYA REACTS TO IRANIAN 'ANTI-SOVIET' REMARKS

PM2319[illegible] Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 24 Dec 86 Morning Edition p 5

[A. Ostalskiy article: "Strange Coincidence"]

[Text] It is evident from reports coming in from Iran that many high-ranking officials of that state are continuing to make statements unfriendly toward our country. They are publicly speaking of the USSR's allegedly "oppressive" policy and trying to impute to the Soviet Union aspirations and plans that are hostile to Iran. It is noteworthy that an attempt to "equate" the USSR and the United States in the eyes of ordinary Iranians and to put their policies toward Iran on a par can be clearly discerned in many statements.

Why has it been found necessary to distort the facts? It is well known that the Soviet Union has always sought good-neighborly relations with Iran, proving this both in words and in deeds. The USSR viewed with sympathy the Iranian people's liberation struggle, vigorously and resolutely supported the 1979 anti-Shah revolution, and helped it to withstand military blackmail, hostile campaigns, and the blockade.

One Iranian leader recently called on the great powers to treat Iran "fairly, in a spirit of equality, and humanely." A legitimate demand! But so far as the Soviet Union is concerned, the appeal is clearly misdirected -- that formula is already totally implemented in the USSR's policy regarding its southern neighbor. However, this certainly cannot be said of the United States.

The history of recent U.S.-Iranian relations offers many instances of unfairness, unconcealed political and military interference, and diktat on the part of the United States. Washington did not shrink from organizing military coups, murders, and massive repression in order to preserve the shah's tyranny, which the Iranians hated. The United States is continuing a similar "strong-arm" policy now. THE WASHINGTON POST has disclosed that the CIA is financing the activity of antigovernment Iranian organizations. A. Madani, former commander of the Iranian Navy, recently admitted that he had received money from the United States in order to wage a struggle against the Khomeyni regime. There are many other reports regarding the active U.S. subversion campaign against Iran, which continues to this day.

Washington's position was frankly formulated by U.S. Vice President G. Bush, who publicly stated 3 weeks ago: "American hearts are full of quite understandable hostility, indeed, hatred toward Khomeyni's Iran. I feel the same way myself. So does the President."

So on the USSR's part there is respect for Iran's sovereignty and independence, noninterference in its internal affairs, and honest, equal cooperation on a mutually advantageous basis, while on the United States' part there is frank hatred, crude pressure, blackmail, interference, and other "dirty tricks." Can there be any question of "equality" between the Soviet and U.S. approaches?

One cannot help noticing that the hostile attacks on the Soviet Union intensified in Iran after the major political scandal over secret military deliveries to Iran erupted in Washington. When it became clear that it would not get away with the latest adventure, unlike previous ones, and when the President's popularity began to decline and many of his supporters abandoned the sinking ship, Washington resorted to its favorite magic spell. The talk, of course, was of a "Soviet threat" to Iran. The "story" was obligingly picked up by the right-wing press, which dusted off the old fairytales about "Russia's desire to gain access to warm seas," "expansionist schemes" regarding the Middle East, and so forth. [paragraph continues]

It would have been astonishing if, finding itself in such a difficult position, the U.S. Administration had not tried to invoke chauvinist prejudices inside its own country and allied "solidarity." But what a strange coincidence -- certain remarks by Iranian officials seem to be "in unison" with Washington's anti-Soviet rhetoric.

The question is inescapable: Why did the U.S. President "get over" his "hatred" and send weapons to Iran? "Irangate" has shown that the Reagan administration is prepared to surrender many of its officially proclaimed "principles" (to say nothing of feelings) for the sake of attempting to open channels for restoring U.S. influence in that country and steering its policy in an anti-Soviet direction. After all, anti-Sovietism -- as history has repeatedly shown -- leads ultimately to the abandonment of anti-imperialist positions, to the weakening of national independence, and sooner or later to subordination to Western influence. There can be no doubt that the Iranian officials' hostile attacks on our country are now being greeted with great satisfaction in Washington and are arousing far-reaching hopes in some quarters...

In most cases the grounds for attacks on the USSR in Tehran are provided by the situation surrounding Afghanistan and the internationalist assistance that the Soviet Union is providing to that country's people. Tehran either cannot or will not understand the true reason for the tension surrounding the DRA. After all, if you consider this issue in an unbiased way, it becomes clear that the threat to Afghanistan's security and sovereignty arose and still persists as a result of foreign, and above all, U.S. interference. This threat is what compelled the DRA Government to turn to the USSR for help.

As is well known, Iran too made its "contribution" to exacerbating the situation; and it actually began to actively interfere in that neighboring country's internal affairs before the USSR sent the limited troop contingent there at the Afghan Government's request. And the money from the sale of U.S. weapons to Iran went not only to the Nicaraguan "contras" but also to the dushman gangs that are used to wage the undeclared war against the DRA.

Thus in its actions regarding Afghanistan, Iran, deliberately or otherwise, is going hand in hand with the "Great Satan," as the United States is termed in Iran. Yet Iranians should know better than anyone what objectives Washington is pursuing in the region and what its "patronage" means.

It is clear that the anti-Soviet remarks of high-ranking Iranian figures are at variance with their own statements that Iran desires the development of normal relations with the USSR. As for the Soviet Union, its position remains precise and clear: We are in favor of genuine good-neighborliness and equal and mutually advantageous cooperation with Iran in the interests of both countries and peace and security in the region.

TUDEH PARTY FIRST SECRETARY ON U.S. ARMS TO IRAN

NC231113 Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in Persian to Iran 1630 GMT 22 Dec 86

[Remarks by 'Ali Khavari, first secretary of the Tudeh Party Central Committee -- recorded; date and place not given]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] What are referred to today as secret contacts between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran began to grow in a way that was very favorable for imperialism. Therefore, this cannot be described as a fleeting incident, a political mistake, or an accident. The leaders turned their backs on the revolution and thus opened the way for U.S. imperialism to recoup its losses in Iran. [passage omitted]

For U.S. imperialism, the recent relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran were not limited to the sale of arms and the release of hostages. U.S. imperialism is interested in prolonging the Iran-Iraq war because it sees that there are great military, political, and economic benefits to be gained from it. The weakening of the two anti-imperialist nations of Iran and Iraq and the horrific human and material losses suffered by both sides are the chief advantages obtained by the U.S. imperialists and their Zionist allies in the region. The sale of arms in return for the release of hostages should be seen from the angle of a political game, involving U.S. imperialism's abominable intentions of regaining its lost position in Iran.

It is interesting to note THE WASHINGTON POST's report that the current phase of relations between the White House and Iran was preceded by cooperation between the CIA and the Islamic Republic's intelligence organs. According to this newspaper, the CIA provided the Islamic Republic with a list of Tudeh Party activists, leading to the execution of 200 of them and to the banning of the party. It was not divine inspiration or blessing, but a fabricated file on the Tudeh Party that was set before the regime as an easily digested dish. The regime had no legal reason to persecute Iran's Tudeh Party. [passage omitted]

Our compatriots, who carried out a united and historic uprising for the sake of freedom, independence, and social justice, and inflicted a heavy blow on imperialism and domestic reaction, now see that not only do they not have freedom and social justice, but their very independence is threatened. They ask themselves why and how the Islamic Republic's leaders retreated from their earlier positions. How could Ayatollah Khomeyni make remarks describing relations between the United States and Iran as a relationship between cat and mouse, or stating that we should go into mourning on the day that the United States praises us? The leaders have now gone so far as to say that if the United States comes to its senses, it will not be a problem to establish relations with it.

The fact that U.S. imperialism is selling arms to the Islamic Republic's leaders for the protraction of the bloody and destructive war shows the endless greed of these merchants of death for profits from this war that is so calamitous for Iraq and Iran. Our compatriots have a different view of correct and just foreign relations. As they see it, the latter are exemplified by the ties that exist between the world's anti-imperialist countries.

The grounds, the record, the length of the secret talks, and their content, show that these dealings between the two countries were not an end in themselves, but a means of establishing unequal relations, such as were rejected by the February revolution.

DOBRYNIN, ALGERIAN ENVOY DISCUSS TIES

LD171844 Moscow TASS in English 1820 GMT 17 Dec 86

[Text] Moscow December 17 TASS -- Anatoliy Dobrynin, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, received Abdellah Feddal, ambassador of the Algerian Democratic and Popular Republic to the USSR and member of the Central Committee of the Party National Liberation Front, at the latter's request. During the friendly talk, the sides discussed some questions of Soviet-Algerian relations and the situation in North Africa and the Middle East.

NICARAGUAN NEWS CONFERENCE WITH 'U.S. SPY' NOTED

LD231337 Moscow TASS in English 1324 GMT 23 Dec 86

[Text] Managua December 23 TASS -- A press conference involving U.S. spy Sam Hall detained by Nicaragua's security agencies was held in Managua on Monday. At the moment of his arrest Hall had in possession documents, maps of military facilities, airfields and location of Sandinist People's Army units, which later were shown to journalists.

The spy admitted that the military facilities the information about which he was trying to get were to become the targets of terrorist and subversive acts. He also told pressmen that the goal of his trip to Nicaragua was to collect secret information on major military facilities, oil storages, and airfields.

Hall said that for several years he had worked as a U.S. military adviser at contras bases in Honduras and taken part in raids into Nicaraguan territory.

CUBA ASSISTED ON FIRST ATOMIC POWER PLANT

LD231450 Moscow TASS in English 1248 23 Dec 86

[Text] Juragua (Cuba) December 23 TASS -- TASS correspondent Aleksandr Kanishchev reports:

The first Cuban atomic power station is being built here with Soviet technical assistance. The builders have begun installation work. The first generating unit is going into operation in 1990 and the second two years later. The second stage of the plant, which will consist, like the first of two 440 megawatt generating units, is being designed.

When the four turbines of the Juragua atomic power station reach their design capacity, power supply to the Cuban economy will be boosted by over 60 per cent. The needs of the country's industrialization and agriculture growth programmes will be met in full. Moreover, the plant will save more than one million tons of oil a year.

Rodrigo Ortis, a deputy minister of the basic industries of Cuba, has said in a TASS interview that a close-knit team of Cuban and Soviet engineers, technicians and workers took shape at the construction project. Good organization and construction work makes it possible to meet plan targets on time and to achieve excellent quality. The project's chief engineer Eduardo Menendez said for his part that joint work with Soviet specialists had become for Cuban power workers a good school of occupational skills and conscientious attitude to work.

NEW VENEZUELAN AMBASSADOR ARRIVES IN MOSCOW

PM230927 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 19 Dec 86 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report under general heading "Official Reports"]

[Text] Eduardo Soto Alvarez, ambassador of the Republic of Venezuela to the USSR, arrived in Moscow 17 December.

Committee, received Abdellah Feddal, ambassador of the Algerian Democratic and Popular Republic to the USSR and member of the Central Committee of the Party National Liberation Front, at the latter's request. During the friendly talk, the sides discussed some questions of Soviet-Algerian relations and the situation in North Africa and the Middle East.

SHCHERBITSKIY ADDRESSES UKRAINIAN CP CC PLENUM

AU191345 Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian 9 Dec 86 pp 1-2

[Unattributed report on speech delivered by V.V. Shcherbitskiy, CPSU Central Committee Politburo member and Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee first secretary, at the 8 December 1986 plenum of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee -- passages between slantlines published in boldface]

[Text] Comrades: The present plenum is discussing one of the republic's key agricultural tasks -- the task of increasing the production in grain. There is no need to prove that its practical accomplishment is of enormous general economic and political importance.

Aware of its responsibility before the party and the people for implementing the Food Program, the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Commitee, the republic's government, and local party, administrative, and economic organs were and are working to intensify grain farming. Concrete measures to increase productivity and stability were drawn up at the October 1982 plenum of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee, and at the 1984 meeting of the republic's aktivists. In the current year, the Central Committee Politburo has approved the measures worked out at kolkhozes and sovkhozes, in rayons and oblasts to increase grain production and procurements in the current 5-year period.

Today it is not out of place to emphasize once again that /owing to the consistent pursuit of the party's agrarian policy, a great production and cadre potential has been created in agriculture, and a great deal has also been done to reform the countryside socially./

In the last 5-year period, the procurements of potatoes, vegetables, meat, milk, and some other produce increased. On the whole, foodstuff supplies to the population improved.

As the analysis shows, the measures taken in grain farming have permitted us to somewhat reduce the effects of the unfavorable weather conditions. However, the efforts to achieve the required yields and stability in grain production failed. In the past 5-year period, the republic's farms in their deliveries to the state fell short of the target by a significant amount of grain.

The causes of this, of course, were disputable. But the main thing was that former agricultural organs -- and the present Ukrainian State Agroindustrial Committee -- a number of obkoms and oblispolkoms were unsatisfactory in organizing the implementation of the measures drawn up, and did not bring persons responsible for this to real account. /And the analysis and conclusions set forth in the decision of the CPSU Central Committee are absolutely right./ The Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee, the republic's Council of Ministers, party obkoms, raykoms, oblispolkoms, rayispolkoms, agroindustrial committees and associations have failed to concentrate the efforts of kolkhoz and sovkhoz leaders and specialists, of scientific institutions, party, administrative and economic organs on settling pressing problems in grain production and in farming as a whole, and have failed to mobilize the wide masses for this purpose.

The CPSU Central Committee has rightly pointed out that the republic's party and administrative organs were inadmissibly slow in restructuring the leadership of the agroindustrial complex. Some leading functionaries, including those at the republic level, are not critical in assessing the state of affairs, put up with serious shortcomings in utilizing land, material and labor resources, and with infringements of technological discipline.

It is also to be admitted that the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee's Secretariat and departments have been insufficiently purposeful, consistent, and persistent in exerting control over the way the adopted decisions were implemented. However, personal responsibility must exist under any collective leadership. Speaking concretely, those bearing responsibility for the shortfall in grain growing and in farming as a whole are primarily Comrade I. A. Mozgovoy, Central Committee secretary, and Comrade Yu.A. Kolomiyets, Council of Ministers first deputy chairman. The speakers rightfully criticized the Ukrainian Council of Ministers, Gosplan, and other organs bearing responsibility for the comprehensive and proportional development of the republic's economy.

The CPSU Central Committee decision and the speeches delivered at the present plenum have also shown shortfalls and omissions in the activity of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee and obkoms. They apply primarily to the work performed by the republic's party committees in selecting and distributing cadres, particularly in the organs of the agroindustrial complex, of control over implementation, and of organizational and political work in labor collectives. These and other critical remarks were right, and the necessary measures will be taken in response to them. All the questions raised and the concrete proposals made will be closely examined.

Above all, V.V. Shcherbitskiy emphasized, it is essential /to increase at all levels responsibility for implementing the adopted decisions, and to strengthen executive discipline./ It is always to be borne in mind that the national economic plan, approved by the Central Committee and confirmed by a session of the Supreme Soviet, has the force of a law and is compulsory.

Since the time when a group of CPSU Central Committee's responsible functionaires and specialists of all-union organs thoroughly examined the situation in the republic's grain farming, we have done something. This was noted in the report and in the speeches. But, let me repeat, it was just /a little./ The brunt of the work still lies ahead.

/This work is to be based on the CPSU Central Committee's conclusions and recommendations, as well as on the decision which will be adopted by this plenum./ Only when all the planned measures are implemented on schedule and fully, and when the shortcomings are resolutely eliminated, will there be a chance, by the end of the 5-year period, to bring the overall yield of grain to 52-54 million metric tons. Only then will the republic be able to fulfill under guarantee the plans for procurements, to supply the population with grain products, and to meet the growing stockbreeding needs for concentrated fodder. In line with the 5-year plan, as early as in 1987 the republic must bring in 50.5 million metric tons of grain and sell to the state 17.5 million metric tons.

If we bear in mind the fact that, in a number of oblasts, the things in winter crop farming are not quite all right, this task is complex. In order to accomplish it, initiative, persistence, purposefulness, and responsibility are needed at all levels.

The Ukrainian State Agroindustrial Committee, along with party obkoms and oblispolkoms, must examine the situation at each farm, and must take all steps necessary to ensure that the planned yield is brought in.

/It is essential to use the existing potential at full capacity, to rely in earnest on science and advanced experience, and to engage all laborers of the agroindustrial complex in accomplishing this responsible task./

Unfortunately, this is precisely the attitude that many party committees, administrative and economic organs still obviously lack.

As is known, at the 27th Ukrainian Communist Party Congress a number of southern oblasts were criticized for having diminished overall yields, particularly of wheat. The results of the current year show that, with the exception of Kherson Oblast, leaders of these oblasts have failed to draw appropriate conclusions from the criticism. In the other oblasts, there have been no significant changes for the better. Odessa Oblast has yielded its positions in a particularly serious way. Notwithstanding the fact that in the 3 years of the 5-year period the supplies of mineral fertilizers to the oblast and the area of irrigated lands trebled, the oblast's average annual production of grain shrank by nearly 500,000 metric tons. In the volume of overall yields, the oblast slipped down from the republic's first to the fourth place, and in per-hectare yields, from the second to the 21st place.

In the current year, the oblast fell short of the target by one-fourth of the planned amount of grain, by 50 percent of sugar beets, and by a significant amount of sunflower seeds and potatoes. Having 222,000 hectares of irrigated lands, the oblast does not meet its own needs even for cabbages, carrots, onions, and other vegetables.

What explains this fact is first of all the poor -- and at times incompetent -- leadership in the agroindustrial complex. The party obkom, the oblispolkom, and the oblast agroindustrial committee do not pursue a clear line in developing grain farming. For the most part, the oblast only pays lip service to the efforts to raise efficiency in the field. The soil protecting system of farming with the application of tilling methods conserving moisture in the soil is being introduced, as it were, "of its own slow accord."

For all that, V.V. Shcherbitskiy pointed out, we have the right to bring to the most severe account Comrade M.G. Galich, obkom secretary and Comrade I.Ya. Sichuk, oblispolkom chairman, who have been responsible for this sector of work for a number of years. Apparently, also the obkom bureau and Comrade A.P. Nochevkin, first secretary, personally have been unable to concentrate the efforts of party, administrative, and economic organs on the sector which needs them.

One has the impression that the oblast's failure in grain production has disturbed neither the State Agroindustrial Committee, nor the Central Committee departments, nor the Affairs Administration of the Ukrainian Council of Ministers, who have actually put up with the situation prevailing in grain farming in Odessa and a number of other southern oblasts. Many main committees and administrations of the State Agroindustrial Committee continue to work in an uncoordinated way and to copy the principles and methods of the previous ministries. They do not get down to the grass roots, and for this reason do not have a real influence on the state of affairs.

I hope, the speaker emphasized, the leaders of Dnepropetrovsk Oblast (Comrades V.G. Boyko and Yu.P. Babich); of Nikolayev Oblast (comrades L.G. Shiryayev and V.I. Ilyin): of Zaporozhye Oblast (Comrades A.P. Sazonov and P.I. Moskalkov): of Voroshilovgrad Oblast (Comrades B.T. Goncharenko and R.O. Zverev); of Kirovograd Oblast (Comrades N.I. Samilyk and V.I. Zheliba); and of some other oblasts, are also aware of their responsibility for the production of grain.

The objective of the organizational and political measures taken to implement the decisions of the 27th CPSU and Ukrainian Communist Party Congresses has been to bring the per-hectare grain yields in the Steppe Zone to 32-33 quintals; in the mixed Steppe-Forest Zone, to 34-35 quintals; and in the Forest Zone, to 29-30 quintals. The ways to accomplish these tasks have already been discussed today. For this reason I would only like to touch upon the sectors of work on which the main attention and forces have to be concentrated.

In his report, Comrade A.P. Lyashko noted that, to raise the production of grain it was of decisive importance to increase the general efficiency of farming and returns from intensive technologies, and to bring the output of corn grain to 10-12 million metric tons. Quite obviously, all these reserves can only be put into effect when /the role and responsibility of all cadres, and first of all specialists, increase./ The number of agronomists, engineers, and technicians alone employed at kolkhozes, sovkhozes, agricultural organs, and scientific institutions, that is the number of those who should be in direct charge of land, has exceeded 200,000. This is an enormous force, and it must produce adequate returns. After all, there are also specialists (and their number, unfortunately, is quite significant) who are not interested in any innovations, who are not abreast of life, and who have been accustomed to work only on command.

Or let us take another issue. In recent years, the per-hectare and overall yields of our basic food crop, winter wheat, have significantly dropped in the republic. Each year, this crop has been perishing and resown on significant areas. And what mattered in this respect were not only the weather conditions. Many people have simply put up with this situation. Nobody actually blamed specialists for that.

For example, the soil and weather conditions in Vinnitsa Oblast rank among the republics best. However, in the last 5-year period the oblast's per-hectare and overall yields of gain went steeply down, and the blast fell short of the target by more than 1 million metric tons of grain. The analysis shows that the main cause of such a drop lay in the fact that an average of about one-third of winter crops used to be resowed in the oblast each year. And nobody was brought to account for this.

Comrade A.I. Lutsenko, at present chairing the oblast agroindustrial committee, has been in charge of the oblast's agriculture for more than a decade. But even this stretch of time proved to be for him too short to acquaint himself with the best kolkhoz and sovkhoz agronomists in the oblast fodder production has been neglected, the situation in beet farming has steeply deteriorated, and the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee Secretariat has severely punished Comrade A.I. Lutsenko for the shortcomings incurred in the development of livestock breeding.

It is obvious that, for the obkom bureau, Comrade L.I. Krovoruchko, and the Ukrainian State Agroindustrial Committee, the time has come to draw from this appropriate conclusions.

The speaker went on by bringing to severe task Comrade A.G. Denisenko, deputy chairman of the republic's State Agroindustrial Committee, who has been in charge of grain farming and seed breeding for many years. He, personally, and the committee's leadership have to resolve whether he is able to remedy the situation. This is the way dictated by life itself to pose the question.

/The slogan "Cadres resolve everything!" has now been filled with a new content, and the importance of the human factor in the practical pursuit of the party line aimed at acceleration has increased in an immeasurable manner./

/For this reason work among people has to be carried out in such a way, as Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev particularly emphasized during his meetings and conversations in Krasnodar and Stavropol Krays, that not only a leader or a specialist, but also each rank-and-file laborer feel his or her responsibility for the results of the collective's work and that aspire to contribute his or her maximum part in the common enterprise./

We must engage in earnest in improving labor organization and payments, and in reducing the administrative and management personnel. It is essential to second the republic's Kolkhoz Council which has recently recommended that the administrative apparatus of the kolkhozes be cut by 19 percent. What matters is to comply with these recommendations in the field in a businesslike manner.

At the same time, it is essential to set properly about applying the forms of labor organization and motivation as proven in practice as /brigade, family, and individual contracting on the basis of authentic economic accountancy./

In 1985, the share of collectives under contract to the republic's kolkhozes and sovkhozes amounted to 39 percent of the total work force, and these collectives accounted for 54 percent of the total gross production. In plant growing, the labor productivity of contracted collectives was 1.6 times higher, and in stockbreeding, 1.3 times.

However, contracting has obviously been underestimated in a number of oblasts, particularly in Volyn, Dnepropetrovsk, and Zaporozhye Oblasts. In many cases, collectives switch over to contracting only in a formal way, and for this reason the contract does not produce due effect.

In 1987, all kolkhoz and sovkhoz subunits should, for the most part, switch over to the contracting principles. And preparations for this must already be made now. It is essential to more vigorously promote integral-process contracting which also encompasses the leading staff and specialists, as well as the shop form of production organization.

V.V. Shcherbitskiy went on by stressing that, under the present conditions, no economic branch, including agriculture, is able to rise to a higher step of scientific-technological process, unless it is based on /science./ But for this purpose science itself must move forward.

How can one count on a success if, for example, the Ukrainian Irrigation Farming Institute under it director Comrade V.I. Ostapov has, for 15 years running, provided kolkhozes and sovkhozes practically with no new wheat varieties or corn hybrids? The area of selected grain crop varieties amounts only to 11 percent of the total area belonging to the V.Ya. Yuryev Plant Growing, Selection, and Genetics Institute, renowned in the past, now headed by Comrade B.P. Guryev. In other words, scientific collectives are frequently idle.

The Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee has repeatedly called the attention of Comrade G.A. Bogdanov, board chairman of the Southern Branch of the All-Union Lenin Academy of Agricultural Sciences, to the big shortcomings in the branch's work. Time passes, but there have been no real changes for the better. Of course, the time has come to reinforce the leadership of this important sector.

The accomplishment of the entire series of tasks discussed today, the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee first secretary then said, largely depends on our efficiency on restructuring /organizational and political work./

More than 500,000 communists are now engaged in agriculture. A large party collective exists practically at each kolkhoz and sovkhoz. However, their influence on developing production is still frequently poor. Many party organizations are unable to concentrate on the main things, to assess the results sharply and in aderence to principle, and to mobilize people to accomplish the outstanding tasks.

This is the case mainly because some party raykoms and gorkoms continue to substitute for administrative and economic organs, seem to be unable to give up the old and obsolete style and methods of work, continue to give commands, to issue many decisions and measures, and to require many data. Naturally enough, under these circumstances, party committees have neither time nor strength left for organizational and political work directly in labor collectives. Such raykoms are, as a rule, only superficially familiar with the actual situation, and poorly work among leading cadres. This, in particular, has been revealed by functionaries of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee who checked into the progress made by Volyn, Crimean, Dnepropetrovsk, Rovno, Kharkov, Khmelnitskiy, and Cherkassy Oblast party committees in restructuring.

While bearing in mind the outstanding tasks, it is now particularly important to attend to each lagging farm concretely and in earnest. This task has been set repeatedly. However, in accordance with data published by the Central Statistical Administration, also the 1985 per-hectare grain yields fell below the 20-quintal mark in a significant part of kolkhozes and sovkhozes. In Rovno and Sumy Oblasts, the number of such farms is particularly large. If these farms increased their yields to the republic's average, we would obtain an addition of nearly 3 million metric tons of grain.

At the same time, in the republic there are exemplary farms. More than 300 kolkhozes are year by year and irrespective of weather conditions obtaining 40 or more quintals of grain per hectare. Such farms exist in each zone and in each oblast, but their experience is being spread simply poorly.

The Ukrainian State Agroindustrial Committee and its local organs must purposefully attend to each lagging collective, must more vigorously promote the economic methods of farming, and most more rapidly switch kolkhozes and sovkhozes over to a basis of self-paying and self-financing.

Party obkoms and raykoms, oblispolkoms and rayispolkoms are, on their part, expected in the nearest future to critically examine the situation in grain production and in farming, and to scrutinize the work performed by party committees, kolkhoz and sovkhoz party organizations, and organs of the agroindustrial complex to raise labor productivity to strengthen farms economically, and to apply the achievements of science and advanced experience.

Thus the tasks for developing grain farming in the entire agroindustrial complex are clear. They are difficult and painstaking. But the republic possesses a production base, the necessary cadres, and finally an instructive experience. And all that has to be used sensibly to increase fertility and obtain the planned yields of grain.

V.V. Shcherbitskiy then touched upon /some tasks for developing the republic's national economy, and upon some questions concerning restructuring and acceleration,/ which must be constantly in the center of attention. Guided by the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress, the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee is thorough and critical in analyzing the situation in branches, oblasts, in individual cities and rayons. It gives practical assistance in the field, and increases the responsibility of cadres for the matter at hand. Since the 27th congress, the Central Committee has discussed reports delivered by 12 obkoms, 3 gorkoms, 2 oblispolkoms and 4 ministries and departments.

The thorough examination of the situation in the field shows that, at all levels, cadres have begun to work more enterprisingly, with more initiative, efficiency, and persistence. Party, state, and labor discipline is being consolidated.

/It is quite obvious that the policy aimed by the party at restructuring and acceleration has already positively affected the situation in the economy and in other spheres. This has been achieved first of all by improving the general social atmosphere and by invigorating the masses of the working people./

Even now one can say that, in the most important indexes, the republic will fulfill the 1986 plan and will reach the annual average of the 5-year tasks. This applies to the growth rates of the national income, and to tasks for profits and for reducing the prime costs of industrial production. In the 11 months of the current year, the rates of increasing production and labor productivity in industry significantly exceeded the annual plan and amounted to 4.4 percent.

Heavy industry has been working better than in previous years. The plans for coal mining, for the extraction of coal, oil, natural gas, iron and manganese ore, for the production of pig iron, steel, and rolled stock are being overfulfilled. The targets for putting into service production capacities of importance, houses, children's and medical establishments, general education and vocational-technical schools are being met. All kinds of transport are abreast of the plans for hauling. Consistent measures are being taken to raise the people's prosperity. In agriculture, the volumes of procured meat, milk, grain, sunflower seeds, potatoes, vegetables, and a number of other produce have risen.

/However, the positive trends in socioeconomic development still have not stabilized, many tasks have not been accomplished, and a radical turn in the activity of party, administrative, and economic organs still has not been made. For this reason, of course, there are no grounds for complacency./

In the republic, there are still many industrial enterprises and building organizations working at a loss. In Vinnitsa Oblast, for example, the share of unprofitable enterprises amounts to one-fifth. In the republic, there are still many enterprises falling short of the plan for the sales of products, for contracted supplies, for increasing labor productivity, for profits and the reduction of prime costs.

Party, administrative, and economic organs at all levels are expected to thoroughly analyze the results of their work, to draw the right conclusions from them, and to take practical steps to overcome the lag wherever it has been incurred, and to find additional reserves for economic development.

The entire work carried out to improve the quality of products is to be kept under constant control It is essential always to keep in mind that quality in a wide sense of the word improves in step with the general development of the national economy.

As is known, the recent session of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet approved the republic's 1987 plan for economic and social development and the budget. The rates and proportions envisaged by the plan are in line with the 5-year targets, and, in many indexes, even exceed the latter. Another peculiarity of the plan consists in its emphasized social purposefulness. On the whole, both the plan and the budget are intense, but feasible and within our powers.

Naturally enough, all must work hard and purposefully to translate them into reality.

The success in fulfilling the 1987 and 5-year plans decisively depends on /better use of the existing production potential./ After all, in accordance with the data published by the Ukrainian Central Statististical Administration, more than 50 percent of industrial facilities put into operation in the last decade still have not reached the planned indexes. The above-norm stocks of material values are still large, and much equipment is idle for a long time. Naturally, this abnormal situation has to be remedied in the first place.

Following the example set in Leningrad and Kharkov, enterprises have to improve and hasten their efforts to /switch over to 2- and 3- shift operations./ In this respect, there are quite a few omissions, including in Kharkov.

Significantly more pains are to be taken to make use of deep reserves in order to hasten economic development. These reserves lie in the wide application of /the achievements of scientific-technological progress./

V.V. Shcherbitskiy pointed out that, in line with the decision of the 27th Ukrainian Communist Party Congress, by the end of the 5-year period the economic effect of applied scientific elaborations should be brought to R4.5-5 billion annually. Work in this direction has been launched, but its scope is still below the existing possibilities. In particular, the utmost is to be done to obtain in the coming year a maximum return from implementing special purpose scientific-technological programs.

No proper use has been made yet of a reserve as important as inventing and rationalizing whose annual effect has to be brought to R1.8-2 billion. After all, each year tens of thousands of rationalizing proposals and patented inventions in the republic, including many at the enterprises of the State Agroindustrial Committee, remain unutilized.

State and economic organs, scientific organizations and public organizations are expected to unite and better coordinate their efforts to widely engage the working people, and particularly youths, in technical creativity. The Ukrainian Council of Ministers and Trade Union Council have to hasten their work on the "Invention and Rationalization-90" program, have to encourage many innovators in their initiative and to organize socialist competitions, to meet the 2-year targets set under the 5-year plan for obtaining the economic effect of inventions and rationalizing proposals by the 70th Anniversary of the Great October.

Let me now emphasize once again the need to take the whole packet of measures provided for by the Social Program. Certainly, the most important task is to commission on schedule houses and other facilities for sociocultural purposes. But notwithstanding the acute needs, even in the current year capital investments for housing construction have not been fully utilized in a number of oblasts, primarily in Kirovograd, Kherson, and Cherkassy Oblasts. The situation in cooperative construction is even worse.

The 1987 plan for putting houses into service is to be exceeded by 2 million square meters of housing space.

Capital investments allocated by the state for the construction of cultural and medical establishments will significantly increase.

Party obkoms and oblispolkoms must tighten control over the progress made in the construction of all facilities in the social sphere and in implementing the program for social reforms in the countryside.

One of the most topical tasks for the coming year will be to further improve the supplies of foodstuffs, above all of meat and dairy products, to the population. As is known, as of 1987 the volumes of procurements are to be planned by oblasts. The republic only draws up for them plans for deliveries to union and republic resources. In this way, oblasts bear full responsibility for supplies to the population. But this does not mean at all that the Gosplan and the State Agroindustrial Committee have to stand aside. They are obligated to control the situation in the field and, if need be, to effectively intervene, and must under no circumstances permit a decline in the market resources.

Next year, the utmost has to be done to keep the volumes of procured meat and milk increasing at least at the rate of the current year.

For this reason party obkoms and oblispolkoms are expected to organize matters in such a way that additional measures be mapped out at kolkhozes and sovkhozes, primarily at the front-ranking ones, to step up the production and procurements of stockbreeding produce, and to exceed the planned indexes. These measures must be approved and be kept under constant control by party committees and bureaus of basic party organizations, as well as by party raykoms and obkoms.

It is important also to make better use of the possibilities of private farms run by the population. This applies in particular to Vinnitsa, Kharkov, and Khmelnitskiy Oblasts, whose population, in the past 5-year period, significantly reduced the private production of meat and milk. And of course, Volyn and Lvov Oblasts are absolutely wrong to envisage in their plans the reduction, by the end of the 5-year period, of meat production at private holdings by 10-11 percent. This will have to be corrected.

V.V. Shcherbitskiy went on by touching upon the task to improve coverage in kind for the commodity turnover plan. An additional production of high-quality consumer goods needed by the population has to be organized in all oblasts, ministries, departments, and at each enterprise even with the slightest possibilities for this. To cut a long story short, the demand of life is to move more quickly in the sector whose importance grows ever more.

The successful completion of the current year and a good start in the next one largely depend on the way we organize our work under the winter conditions. This reminder has to be made because we happened to have years when our losses were heavy and irreparable. There are difficulties even now. From Zaporozhye, Dnepropetrovsk, Ivano-Rankovsk, and some other oblasts there have been complaints about the shortage of heat and water, about irregularities in city transport and consumer services. Things must be put in order everywhere. This is the first duty of executive committees of the soviets of people's deputies.

We will be able to accomplish the outstanding tasks, V.V. Shcherbitskiy emphasized, only when people are really willing to cooperate. All means of organization and political work must now be used to develop massive socialist competitions in honor of the 70th anniversary of the Great October, and to encouage intense socialist pledges and counterplans, particularly in branches supplying raw materials.

/The accountability and election campaign, which was the first to be held since the party congress and which has been completed recently in basic party organizations, showed that the Communists have received the need to restructure wholeheartedly and have been criticial in assessing the situation./

Party committees are expected to pay more attention to numerically small organizations, examine each proposal and remark made at the meetings, and take them into account in their work.

The facts referred to at the present plenum attest to the need to select and distribute cadres in a more purposeful manner, and to strengthen the cadre reserve at all levels with people capable of accomplishing new responsible tasks.

/The domestic political activity of our party and state is closely coupled with the accomplishment of tasks for acceleration./ In this context, the speaker noted two points.

/Point one./ Following the Reykjavik Soviet-American meeting, a qualitatively new situation has emerged in the world. The efforts of the CPSU and the Soviet Union have met with a growing support on the part of the international public and of political circles in various countries.

Well, and precisely when historic chances have emerged to improve the internatioal situation, the U.S. Administration resolved to bury the provisional 1972 agreement and the 1979 SALT Treaty, thus striking a blow to the structure of basic accords in the field of limiting strategic arms, a structure created over 15 years.

In its statement, the Soviet Government had its principled and convincing say about this major error and provocations committed by the U.S. Administration, about the attempt to check the trend toward relaxing international tension.

The need to invigorate the efforts to make a progress in limiting arms, and the practical ways of and prospects for settling a number of present urgent problems were convincingly explained by M.S. Gorbachev during his visit to India, a visit that had a wide response all over the world. In our work among people, the highly important CPSU Central Committee documents concerning foreign political issues should always be kept n the center of attention.

/Point two/. The mechanism of cooperation among the countries of socialism is now being actively perfected. This was the purpose of the recent meeting held in Moscow by the leaders of the fraternal parties in CEMA member countries, and of the routine session of the CEMA Council which took place in Bucharest before. In particular, it is known that favorable conditions are now being created for developing direct links and close production and scientific-technological cooperation among enterprises and associations in the countries of the socialist community.

This undertaking is, of course, complex and responsible. For this reason, for all party and economic organs and for labor collectives it is a matter of paramount importance to accomplish export supplies on time, as well as tasks connected with implementing the comprehensive program for scientific-technoloical progress in CEMA member-states.

It is perfectly evident that our country's foreign political positions and power are firmly based on the creative energies of the people. Thus to make the labor of the Soviet people even more productive, to observe the strictest discipline and good organization everywhere, and to manifest initiative, political consciousness and vigilance are the main requirements dictated both by domestic and by international factors.

At the end V.V. Scherbitskiy said:

We have begun a great and difficult, but pressing undertaking: By accelerating scientific-technological progress and making use of new economic management methods, we aim to raise the effectiveness of communal production, and on the basis of changing the style and methods of work, and of wide democratization and publicity, to ensure a qualitative renewal in all spheres of life in our society. /The party and the people fully support this policy of the CPSU Central Committee, and they actively help pursue this policy. The ways to accomplish the tasks have been determined. The first steps have already been taken. These steps inspire hopes and confidence./

But the main work still lies ahead. And it is obvious, comrades, that everyone has to set about the matter more thoroughly, more firmly -- as they say -- with both hands and without wasting time.

CPSU CC HITS 'UNCRITICAL' PERM OBLAST LEADERS

PM161135 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 10 Dec 86 First Edition pp 1, 2

[Unattributed report: "At the CPSU Central Committee"]

[Text] The CPSU Central Committee has heard a report on the work of the Perm Party Obkom. The resolution adopted notes that the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress and the course of accelerating the country's socioeconomic development were received with approval in the oblast's party organizations and in all collectives and generated a political and labor upsurge among the people. The industrial output and labor productivity growth rates achieved since the beginning of the year exceed the targets for the first year of the 5-year plan. The plan for grain sales to the state was fulfilled and purchase of livestock products have increased.

However, as an investigation and analysis of work have shown, the oblast party organization is still underutilizing the favorable opportunities afforded since the congress for profound qualitative changes in economic and social life.

The party obkom is proving slow to translate the general party directives into practical action and is not doing enough to ensure that the congress instructions, its principled and exacting approach, its openness in exposing shortcomings and omissions, and the high moral and spiritual tone which it set are firmly established in every party committee and every primary party organization.

The party obkom's activity is lacking in dynamism, scope, and efficiency. The oblast's party committees have failed to draw the appropriate lessons from the fact that the development of the economy and the social sphere had slowed down in recent years, and they have not managed to establish the root causes of the phenomena of stagnation. The existing powerful production, scientific, and cadre potential is used inefficiently and the working people's initiative is not being adequately developed.

The work of party, soviet, and economic organs, public organizations, and labor collectives is not geared sufficiently to identifying and bringing into play reserves for labor productivity growth and improved output quality or to stepping up the economy drive. In implementing these tasks, the party obkom has confined itself to timid half-measures. Only 38 percent of the available capital investments are being channeled into the reconstruction and retooling of production. [paragraph continues]

The development of a number of chemical and petroleum industry machine-building and chemical, petrochemical, and food industry enterprises is proceeding according to blueprints based on obsolete equipment and technology. The transfer of the machine-building sectors to two- and three-shift working is proceeding extremely slowly.

The obkom has been unable to create a united front of all sectors in the struggle for acceleration. At many enterprises, the situation in state and planning discipline has not improved. Certain cities, rayons, sectors, and enterprises are confidently advancing, while others are marking time or even slipping back. In the first 10 months of the first year of the 12th 5-Year Plan the Komi-Permyatskiy Okrug and 11 cities and rayons failed to fulfill the plan for industrial output sales. More than 40 percent of the enterprises operating under the new management conditions failed to meet their delivery targets, and one in five failed to meet the targets for labor productivity growth. Many collectives make poor use of the CPSU Central Committee June (1986) Plenum appeal to develop the working people's initiative and activeness.

Work in the agroindustrial complex sectors is of a low standard. In agriculture the way the introduction of intensive techniques is organized is unsatisfactory, questions of enhancing soil fertility and livestock productivity and developing feed production are being neglected, and one-third of farms are operating at a loss. Resolute measures to reduce state subsidies for meat and milk and to improve food supplies to the population on the basis of the exploitation of existing potential have not been adopted. There are big delays in the creation of the material base for storing potatoes, fruit, and vegetables.

The party obkom and the oblispolkom have a poor record in solving social questions. The development of the social sphere is deplorably inadequate and is lagging behind the development of the production sphere. Targets for the construction of housing, schools, children's preschool establishments, hospitals, and polyclinics have not been met. Funds allocated for these purposes have not been assimilated. Many clubs, cultural centers, and libraries are in a poor state of repair.

The CPSU Central Committee takes the view that the serious shortcomings in the development of the economy and the social sphere are above all a consequence of the absence of any substantial changes in the work style of the obkom and its bureau, marked by obsolete methods and approaches. Their work is still not oriented enough toward people and live issues. The old habit of side-stepping problems and being content with mediocre results makes itself felt.

Compliance with the demand put forward by the 27th CPSU Congress and the Central Committee April (1985) and June (1986) Plenums to enhance the practicality and efficiency of cadres is frequently supplanted by declarations and appeals. The tendency to hold too many meetings and conferences persists. Effective monitoring of the implementation of party decisions and internal resolutions is lacking. Little attention is being paid to the strengthening of party discipline and the development and strengthening of intraparty democracy. The role of party committee plenums and party conferences is underrated. During preparations for these events the views of rank-and-file communists, workers, and specialists are not sufficiently taken into account. Restricted numbers of people are allowed to take part in discussion in accordance with a list of names drawn up in advance, and criticism is usually aimed downward from above.

All this is lowering the standards of the work of party committees as organs of political leadership. [paragraph continues]

The Komi-Permyatskiy Okruzhkom, the Berezniki, Solikamsk, Kizel, and Chusovoy Gorkoms, and the Kochevskiy, Suksunskiy, Kosinskiy and some other Perm city raykoms have failed to show proper concern for stepping up the party's influence in key sectors of production, the service sphere, science, and culture. Party organs work mainly with leading workers and a limited aktiv and they fail to reach the grassroots components of the party, rank-and-file communists, and the nonparty masses.

Party committees are frequently supplanting soviet, trade union, and economic organs, and this has a negative effect on the development of initiative and enterprise. The oblispolkom is doing little to enhance economic efficiency or encourage the comprehensive development of the production and social infrastructure and is tolerating nonfulfillment of environmental protection measures. The process of establishing state agroindustrial committee organs is dragging on. The experience of the Berezniki titanium-magnesium combine in improving working conditions and reducing sickness rates among working people, which was approved by the CPSU Central Committee, and the experience of collectives in other parts of the country in accelerating scientific and technical progress, improving production organization, and resolving social tasks has not been widely disseminated.

Cadre questions continue to be dealt with without the necessary principle and consistency. The bias against the nomination of young, promising workers and women has not yet been overcome. Many party committees lack the skill and the patience needed to help nominated officials to master the tasks with which they have been entrusted. For this reaseon kolkhoz chairmen, sovkhoz directors, and specialists are frequently being replaced. Serious damage is caused by the fact that the selection and nomination of leading cadres are frequently decided by party committee first secretaries without businesslike collective discussion and without examining the working people's views.

The party organizations' ideological work suffers because it is divorced from life and from the tasks of restructuring and acceleration that are being tackled by the party and the people. Large numbers of scientists, specialists in agriculture, and cultural figures are uninvolved in this work. Party committees, soviet organs, and public organizations are not doing much to implement the congress instruction to focus efforts on individual work with people, and they do not take the specific characteristics of the various sections of the population sufficiently into account. Little attention is being paid to propagandizing the best traditions of the oblast's working class, enhancing the initiative of engineering and technical personnel, and educating the artistic and creative intelligentsia. There are immoral phenomena in the behavior of young people. The importance of work to promote atheism is underestimated.

The struggle against drunkenness is waged unsystematically, with a narrow scope, and without the broad participation of labor collectives. Home distilling has not decreased and drug addiction has not been eradicated. Vigorous measures have yet to be taken to step up the struggle against violations of labor discipline and law and order and to stamp out unearned income.

The press, radio, and television have still not properly joined in the process of restructuring. It is difficult to determine from the nature and content of material in the oblast newspaper ZVEZDA what questions are currently at the focus of the oblast party organization's attention. The obkom bureau has not backed up a single critical article by its press organ this year. The militancy of rayon newspapers is low.

Particular responsibility for the fact that restructuring is making no headway rests with Obkom First Secretary Comrade B.V. Konoplev, Oblispolkom Chairman Comrade V.A. Petrov, and other members of the party obkom bureau, many of whom have been in charge of key sectors of work in the oblast for many years, the resolution emphasizes. Their approach to the assessment of the situation in the oblast is uncritical, they frequently do not see their own omissions, miscalculations, and mistakes, and they try to justify the lag in many sectors by reference to all kinds of external circumstances.

The CPSU Central Committee has drawn the attention of the Perm Party Obkom Bureau to serious omissions in its work and to sluggishness and inconsistency in restructuring the activity of the oblast's party, soviet, and economic organs, primary party organizations, and labor collectives.

The CPSU obkom is instructed to make a thorough, self-critical analysis of the content and methods of its activity and the activity of the party okruzhkom, gorkoms and raykoms in the period since the CPSU Central Commitee April (1985) Plenum and the 27th CPSU Congress and to implement specific measures to eliminate the existing shortcomings; to create everywhere an atmosphere of creative, committed participation by communists and all working people in the struggle for acceleration; to conduct the restructuring more actively from above and from below; to ensure greater openness; to develop criticism and self-criticism in every way; and to strive for unity of word and action.

The resolution points out that the key task of the oblast party organization is to bring the oblast's economy in line with leading positions in terms of technical standards and efficiency without delay and to ensure fulfillment of the 5-year plan targets without fail in all indicators; to focus attention on labor productivity growth and the reinforcement of contract discipline and to ensure that all the main output with the Perm brand meets the highest Soviet and world standards; firmly and consistently to implement measures for the reconstruction, renewal, and efficient utilization of production facilities; to display maximum concern for the thrifty expenditure of all types of resources, and especially metal, fuel, and electricity; to effectively monitor the introduction of new management methods, the principles of financial autonomy, the collective contract, methods of self-finance and self-support, and state acceptance of output at industrial enterprises.

The oblast party organization is instructed to overcome the long-standing shortfall in the production of mineral fertilizers, heavy electrical equipment, consumer goods, and timber exports. With a view to overcoming the imbalance in the development of a number of sectors it must accelerate the rate of commissioning of capacities at the Perm GRES, transport facilities, and processing industry and construction base enterprises.

Measures must be adopted to increase the output of agricultural products from kolkhozes and sovkhozes, subsidiary farms belonging to the population, and enterprises with a view to substantially improving the supplies of food products to the population on the basis of the utilization of the oblast's own internal reserves, and steps must be taken to eradicate manifestations of parasitism. The oblast's industrial potential must be utilized more fully for the purposes of providing assistance to sovkhozes and kolkhozes.

The CPSU Central Committee instructs the CPSU obkom, the oblispolkom, and the economic organs to intensify the social thrust of economic development in the oblast; to ensure a more effective utilization of labor resources and take care to create in every collective the necessary preconditions for highly productive labor and good living and leisure conditions; to attend more specifically to questions of the mechanization of labor-intensive processes, especially in the construction industry, coal mining, and timber procurement and at livestock raising units; and to end the toleration of low production standards and violations of labor safety regulations.

Daily attention must be paid to questions connected with implementing the party's task of ensuring that by the year 2000 every family has a separate apartment or house; to step up attention to the provision of amenities in Perm and other cities and villages, especially in the northern zone of the oblast; and to ensure their modern and comprehensive development.

The CPSU obkom, the Komi-Permyatskiy Okruzhkom, and the CPSU gorkoms and raykoms are instructed to struggle more energetically to ensure that a responsible attitude to the fulfillment of plans and socialist pledges, a high standard of organization and discipline, intolerance of shortcomings, and comradeship and mutual assistance are established as the norm in every labor collective. They must give all-round support to creative, enterprising people who put forward valuable ideas and proposals. They must contribute more actively to the establishment of new workers dynasties, firmly establish the principle of social justice in daily life, and react more sharply to deviations from the norms of socialist communal life.

The militancy of primary party organizations must be persistently enhanced and steps taken to ensure that they make fuller use of the rights and powers invested in them by the CPSU Statutes. Specific attention must be paid to organizations which continue to work along the old lines, are infected with formalism, and instead of monitoring the activities of the administration in a principled fashion are under the thumb of lazy economic managers.

Party committees, as organs of political leadership, must always proceed on the basis of the degree to which the party's program aims and the 27th CPSU Congress decisions are being implemented and the interests and requirements of the working people are being met. They must seek to improve the forms and methods of leadership and help cadres to cast off the habit of resorting to old, ineffective methods when trying to resolve new tasks. They must enhance the role of collective organs within party organizations in the elaboration and implementation of production and social tasks. They must strive for a more specific, businesslike approach in the work of party committee bureaus, sections, and the apparatus.

Party committees must overcome the practice of supplanting soviet, trade union, and economic organs. They must seek to ensure in every possible way that the soviets make better use of the powers invested in them by the CPSU Central Committee, USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, and USSR Council of Ministers resolution of 25 July 1986. They must encourage initiative and independence in the actions of Komsomol organizations. The main objective is to achieve a situation in which every organ and every official attends to a set task and is answerable for it.

In establishing the new style of work, greater demands must be made on party committee first secretaries, whose stance, way of life, and conduct largely determine how consistently and vigorously work is restructured. A party leader is expected to contribute to the effective organization of his close colleagues' work, to support and develop their initiative, and generally ensure that all personnel fulfill the tasks entrusted to them.

The attention of party committees is drawn to the need to seriously improve work with cadres as the key component in the implementation of restructuring. They must ensure strict observance of Leninist principles in the selection, placement, and training of cadres and the creation of a reliable reserve from which cadres can be drawn. Special attention must be paid to people entrusted with the leadership of labor collectives, and efforts must be made to ensure that labor collectives are headed by people with a modern way of thinking, people who are open to innovation. The role of primary party organizations in the implementation of cadre policy must be enhanced.

The paramount task of party cadres is to learn themselves and to teach others to work in conditions of increased democracy. Today only a party, soviet, or economic leader who approaches work from party and state positions and lives for the working people's common interests can count on success.

The oblast party committees and primary party organizations must make fuller and more effective use of ideological work to enhance the political, social, and labor activeness of people and instill in them a sense of being in charge of their country and their enterprise. They must implement specific measures to encourage communists and all the working people to study in depth the CPSU Program, the Central Committee Political Report, and other documents of the 27th CPSU Congress and CPSU Central Committee plenums. They must instill in every person a conscious attitude to his duties, a Marxist-Leninist world outlook, and intolerance of petit-bourgeois mentality, morality, and everything that is alien to our system.

The CPSU Central Committee noted the need to radically improve the practice of party leadership of the news media and to constantly rely on them in ensuring greater openness, raising and widely discussing vital problems, criticizing mistakes and shortcomings, backing everything that is new and progressive, and providing truthful and prompt information to broad public circles.

GROMYKO CHAIRS SUPREME SOVIET PRESIDIUM SESSION

LD231438 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1410 GMT 3 Dec 86

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] Hello, comrades. A USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium session was held in the Kremlin today under the chairmanship of Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko. The question of the work of soviets of peoples' deputies in Tatar ASSR, concerned with improving the style and methods of their activities in the light of the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress, was examined. The question of the work of soviets of peoples' deputies in Kaluga Oblast, concerned with protecting public order and fighting violations of the law, was also examined. The decisions adopted on these matters will be published in the press.

The results of the activities of the USSR Supreme Soviet in 1986 were discussed at the session. A plan for the main measures being designated to be carried out in the highest organ of state power in the country next year was approved. The USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium examined some other questions of state life.

Comrades Gorbachev, Shcherbitskiy, Demichev, Yeltsin, Slyunkov, and Solovyev took part in the discussion of questions on the agenda.

CPSU CC ISSUES RESOLUTION ON FARM EFFICIENCY

PM191531 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 18 Dec 86 First Edition p 1

[Unattributed report: "At the CPSU Central Committee"]

[Text] The CPSU Central Committee has adopted a resolution "On Urgent Measures To Enhance Labor Productivity in Agriculture on the Basis of the Introduction of Rational Forms of Labor Organization and Financial Autonomy."

The resolution notes that the prevailing production and economic situation in the countryside and the consistent implementation of the course of the all-round intensification of crop farming and livestock raising have created favorable preconditions for a resolute switch everywhere to new methods of management and an extensive development of rural worker's production activity.

The practice of recent years shows that the best results are achieved wherever financial autonomy relations have been fully mastered at all levels of production and the collective contract and intensive techniques have been introduced. This work has become more purposeful since the CPSU Central Committee conference in Belgorod. By ensuring a high level of personal interest among machine operators, livestock breeders, and other workers in the results of their labor, financial autonomy and the collective contract method are already having a great impact on the enhancement of social production efficiency on many kolkhozes and sovkhozes.

Among the various forms of application of the collective contract method, numerically relatively small, intensive labor links and teams which are allocated land, machinery, and other means of production on the basis of long-term contracts appear to do best. The family contract is becoming more and more popular in all parts of the country.

However, the introduction of financial autonomy and the collective contract is still beset by much formalism and irresponsibility. On many farms this work is implemented without the proper training of cadres and without detailed elaboration of contract commitments. Supplies of resources to contract collectives are frequently not guaranteed and the economic incentives to promote thrift are poor. A serious omission is also the failure to bring the structure of production management at farm level in line with the demands of the new financial autonomy relations. The bookkeeping and economic services of kolkhozes and sovkhozes are not coordinated and sector specialists are not being involved enough in economic work.

In the work with contract links, teams, and livestock units administration by injunction is frequently applied, democratic principles of management are violated, and the role and rights of labor collectives are encroached upon.

The CPSU Central Committee instructs the union republic communist party central committees, party kraykoms, obkoms, and raykoms, the USSR Gosagroprom [State Agroindustrial Committee], union and autonomous republic councils of ministers, krayispolkoms, oblispolkoms, and rayispolkoms, and farm managers radically to improve organizational and political work to ensure the extensive introduction of financial autonomy, the collective contract, and intensive techniques in all components of agricultural production, regarding this matter as obligatory and essential for all the country's kolkhozes and sovkhozes.

It is proposed to critically review the state of affairs in mastering the economic methods of management in every collective and to define specific measures to introduce financial autonomy and the collective contract in all the main production subdivisions, having created the necessary objective preconditions for this. The start-to-finish contract, the family contract, and other progressive forms of labor organization and stimulation are to be developed in every way. Special attention is drawn to the impermissiblility of adopting a formalistic approach and working along sterotyped lines and in fits and starts in this important matter. It is necessary to consistently seek to expand the economic independence of labor collectives and to enhance their role in and responsibility for the fulfillment of contract commitments. The pay of all farm personnel including managers and specialists must be made dependant on the end results of their work.

The CPSU Central Committee regards the speediest possible mastering of the economic methods of management by all agroindustrial production components as a task of paramount importance. It is necessary everywhere to make use of the winter period to ensure the mass training of all cadres in economic practices, efficient production organization, and progressive techniques in an effort to make sure that every worker knows his job perfectly and is able to ensure high-quality and highly productive work at his workplace. Differentiated training should be provided for different jobs and special skills and carried out directly on farms, in teams, and at livestock units where this work is organized in exemplary fashion and high results have been obtained. The role of scientific institutions, VUZ's, and base enterprises in this matter must be enhanced. Job certification specifying the appropriate qualifications must be carried out in all production and management components and this matter must be regarded as obligatory.

The USSR Gosagroprom is instructed, without delay and taking account of the achievements of science and accumulated experience, to elaborate training programs which meet the demands of the economic management mechanism and all-round production intensification. A task of paramount importance is to enhance the standard of substantiation of the normatives governing the activity of financially autonomous subdivisions on the basis of the latest scientific developments and the experience of the country's foremost kolkhozes and sovkhozes.

The V.I. Lenin All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences is instructed to intensify scientific research in the sphere of management, labor organization, and production intensification and to grear its activity more closely to the provision of practical assistance to kolkhozes and sovkhozes in their efforts to master progressive techniques and introduce financial autonomy and the contract method.

Editorial offices of central and local newspapers, the Agroprom publishing house, the USSR State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting, the USSR State Committee for Cinematography, and the All-Union Znaniye Society are instructed to ensure the systematic dissemination of progressive experience in the application of financial autonomy, progressive forms of labor organization and payment, and intensive techniques and to reveal in detail their key importance for the implementation of the Food Program and the fulfillment of the 12th 5-Year Plan targets.

REPORTAGE ON VETERANS CONFERENCE IN MOSCOW

CPSU CC Greetings

PM231540 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 17 Dec 86 Second Edition p 1

[Message from the CPSU Central Committee to the participants in the constituent conference of the All-Union Organization of War and Labor Veterans]

[Text] To the participants in the constituent conference of the All-Union Organization of War and Labor Veterans:

Dear Comrades!

The CPSU Central Committee warmly and cordially greets you, the participants in the constituent conference of the All-Union Organization of War and Labor Veterans.

Your conference is taking place on the threshold of a great event -- the 70th anniversary of Great October. The Soviet people have great gratitude toward their veterans. The veterans of the revolution and of the Civil and Patriotic Wars are rightly their pride and glory. They marched on autocracy, struggled for the power of the soviets, and in fierce fighting with the enemies they upheld the honor, freedom, and independence of the motherland. The feat of the workers of the rear and of the first and postwar 5-year plans is unforgettable -- they raised the country from the ruins and strengthened its might by their selfless labor. Major successes in the economy, the social and political spheres, science, and culture are associated with the deeds of the older generations. The veterans' combat feats and labor achievements are for Soviet people an inexhaustible source of unbounded loyalty to communist ideals, an example of courage, industriousness, discipline, and will for victory.

In our day, when the process of profound restructuring of all aspects of Soviet society's life is under way, the veterans are still in service, wherever they may be: in the production collectives, the Armed Forces, institutions or educational establishments, in well earned retirement, in the family -- everywhere they devote their strength, knowledge, and very rich experience to the fatherland's further prosperity. The party values highly the veterans' unanimous support for its innovative course and their committed participation in the struggle of the whole people to implement the 27th CPSU Congress decisions.

Veterans enjoy nationwide attention in our country. Concern for the older generation is the high moral duty of Soviet society and the obligation of every labor collective and of state and public organizations.

The All-Union Organization of War and Labor Veterans has a noble task -- to promote still more active participation by the veterans in the country's economic and sociopolitical life and in the moral, labor, and military-patriotic education of young people. The veterans association could also do much to improve consumer and medical services for the veterans and to organize their leisure and contacts. There is no doubt that the veterans' organization will make a worthy contribution to strengthening peace and to the cause of preventing nuclear catastrophe. Its creation is further vivid confirmation of the development of socialist democracy.

The CPSU Central Committee wishes the conference participants fruitful work and expresses confidence that the veterans, continuing the glorious traditions, will continue to be reliable helpers for the party in communist building.

We wish you, dear comrades, good health and prosperity, vigor, and great successes in your activity for the sake of the socialist motherland.

The CPSU Central Committee

Lizichev Addresses Meeting

PM221031 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Dec 86 Second Edition p 2

[Report by correspondent Colonel A. Pimenov on 17 December Moscow founding conference of the All-Union War and Labor Veterans Organization: "Educating Patriots"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Veterans and young people... It is the moral and civic duty of the older generation to pass on like a spiritual baton to the rising generation devotion to Great October's ideas, love of the motherland, and readiness to defend it selflessly. Many participants in the conference talked about this from the platform. Army General A.D. Lizichev, chief of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate, devoted his speech to this topic.

You know well the international situation today and its acuteness, he said. And this is why the major tasks advanced by the 27th party congress include the task of comprehensively improving the Soviet state's defense capability and building up our Armed Forces' combat potential in every possible way. In our view a most important sphere, in which we have very great need of veterans' experience and knowledge, is the further strengthening of the personnel's spiritual strength and the mobilization of the human factor in the interests of the motherland's defense. In point of fact, you are all involved in this. The future soldier is influenced by schoolteachers and masters of vocational training, workers in labor collectives, reserves or retired officers and generals... And it has to be said that we all sense very fully the result and effectiveness of that influence in Army and Navy collectives. All this is expressed, indeed focused, in the degree of responsibility and discipline and in the diligence of soldiers and sailors.

Emissaries from many republics, Moscow and Leningrad, and Brest, Bryansk, Voronezh, Kaluga, Kuybyshev, Minsk, and other oblasts are serving well in the Army and Navy. Many of them recall with gratitude their first mentors -- the military leaders in general educational and vocational and technical schools -- almost half of whom are veterans of the war and the Armed Forces. They essentially lay the first "little brick" in the training of the new generation of army ranks. And it is mostly a reliable and worthy generation. However, what used to suit us in military-patriotic education yesterday can no longer satisfy us today, Army General A.D. Lizichev went on to say. You know better than anyone the strides that military matters are making. The time allocated to mastering combat specialties has been reduced to a bare minimum. Soldiers' and sailors' work demands the greatest composure of men in whom knowledge, reason, will, nerve, and physical strength are bound together like a tightly coiled spring. So we in the Army and Navy expect to receive young men who are ideologically and morally self-confident and spiritually and physically strong -- real patriots and internationalists.

So it is a question of more effectively molding in young people views that form part of a world outlook, a profound understanding of the military and political situation that has take shape in the world today, and the ability to evaluate current events from class positions. The fostering in young people of a class hatred of imperialism, the greatest vigilence, and what I would call a militant alertness is now assuming tremendous significance, as never before. Without such preparation of a conscript's consciousness it is hard to count on his adapting swiftly in a military environment or becoming quickly aware of his new role.

Who, if not war and labor veterans with their experience, knowledge, and sincere closeness and sensitivity to people, is to exert an active influence on this process?

We believe that an aspect of education such as fostering love of military service in young people of draft age also demands considerably greater attention. This is no speculative conclusion. We sometimes encounter instances of certain conscripts' not considering it obligatory to prepare themselves for service. Purposeful individual educational work by veterans with juveniles, particularly those with educational difficulties, would be a great help here.

We also allocate to your organization a more active role in the heroic-patriotic education of the Army itself and its personnel. We await you in the units and on the ships. Because you are the living bearers of heroic revolutionary, combat, and labor traditions, and these must be passed on like a baton to today's defenders of the motherland.

The Ministry of Defense, the Main Political Directorate, and military organs locally will cooperate closely with veterans organizations in resolving the current tasks.

In conclusion, Army General A.D. Lizichev wished the veterans success in their noble and important work. [passage omitted]

MOSCOW MEETING COMMEMORATES MARSHAL ROKOSSOVSKIY

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[Major B. Khudoleyev report: "In K.K. Rokossovskiy's Memory"]

[Text] A soiree devoted to the 90th anniversary of the birth of Marshal of the Soviet Union Konstantin Konstantinovich Rokossovskiy was held at the M.V. Frunze Central House of the Soviet Army 19 December.

The presidium consisted of Marshal of the Soviet Union S.F. Akhromeyev, USSR first deputy defense minister and chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces; A.N. Aksenov, chairman of the USSR State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting and chairman of the Soviet-Polish Friendship Society Board; Marshal of the Soviet Union S.K. Kurkotkin, USSR deputy defense minister; Colonel General V.S. Nechayev, deputy chief of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate; and generals, admirals, officers, war veterans, and representatives of public organizations and of the Polish Embassy in the USSR.

The soiree was opened by Army General I.N. Shkadov. Chief Marshal of Artillery V.F. Tolubko read a report on the life and career of Konstantin Konstantinovich Rokossovskiy -- celebrated Soviet military commander, ardent patriot and internationalist, marshal of the Soviet Union and marshal of Poland, and twice Hero of the Soviet Union.

Division General (V. Shklyarskiy), deputy chief of staff of the Warsaw Pact states' Joint Armed Forces; Army Generals I.I. Gusakovskiy and D.D. Lelyushenko; and poet and frontline fighter Ye.A. Dolmatovskiy narrated their reminiscences of K.K. Rokossovskiy, legendary military commander and communist-serviceman.